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I. RICO: REFORM ON THE HORIZON?
A. Defining a "Pattern": H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone
Co.
In H.J Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,' the Supreme Court
continued its attempt2 to meaningfully define the "pattern of racketeer-
ing activity" requirement of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganization Act (RICO).3 The Court provided some clarification, holding
* Gail Vasterling, Project Editor. Special thanks to Professor Kathleen F. Brickey, George
Alexander Madill Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law, for her suggestions and
guidance with this project.
1. 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
2. The Court made an earlier attempt to define "pattern of racketeering activity" in Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985). See infra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988). RICO is title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
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that a "pattern" does not require separate schemes.4 Nonetheless, its ef-
forts should do little to appease those critics5 advocating a congressional
amendment of RICO to remedy the vagueness inherent in the current
statutory formulation. In a scathing concurrence, Justice Scalia openly
denounced the statute's ambiguity and suggested that RICO's pattern
requirement might be vulnerable to a constitutional challenge.6
RICO imposes criminal and civil liability on persons who engage in
certain "prohibited activities," 7 which involve some connection with a
"pattern of racketeering activity."' RICO defines "racketeering activity"
as "any act or threat involving" specified state-law crimes,9 any "act"
indictable under specified federal statutes,"° and certain federal "of-
fenses.""1 RICO's "definitions" section,"2 however, does not explain
(OCCA), Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922. All RICO offenses require proof of a "pattern of racke-
teering activity" or a "collection of an unlawful debt." 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988). See infra note 8
and accompanying text.
4. For an analysis of the "separate schemes" approach rejected by the Court, see infra notes
24-26 and accompanying text. A "pattern" by definition, however, does require multiple predicate
acts. See infra note 13 and accompanying text for a discussion of RICO's pattern requirement.
5. See, e-g., Blakely, Alternative Legislative PrAoposals to the "RICO Reform Act of 1989"t 5
Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 1 (Aug. 15, 1989) (RICO's author proposes modification of
"pattern of racketeering" requirement, including minimum requirement of three acts of racketeer-
ing); Supporters of RICO Bill Deny Opposition Charges of "Special Interest' Legislation, 5 Civ. RICO
Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 1 (June 20, 1989) (remarks of Antonio Califa, legislative counsel for the
American Civil Liberties Union) (Civil RICO threatens first amendment rights); Matthews Says
RICO Bill Likely to Pass, Ensuring Continued Civil Litigation; 5 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 4
(June 20, 1989) (remarks of Arthur Matthews, Washington, D.C. attorney) (proposed amendment
provides no clarification of existing RICO definitions, resulting in even more RICO litigation).
6. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
7. The activities prohibited include: investing income derived from a pattern of racketeering
in any business which engages in or affects interstate or foreign commerce; acquiring, through racke-
teering activity, an interest in any business which engages in or affects interstate or foreign com-
merce; or conducting the affairs of any business which engages in or affects interstate or foreign
commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
8. Id. The statute also proscribes activities involving "the collection of an unlawful debt". See
supra note 3.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(A) (1988) (includes state crimes punishable by more than one year of
imprisonment that involve murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing
in obscene matter, or dealing in dangerous drugs).
10. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1)(B), (C), (E) (1988) (includes acts indictable under various statutes
found in U.S. Code titles 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedure) and 29 (Labor), and acts indictable
under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act (1988) Pub. L. No. 91-508, tit. II, 84
Stat. 1118 (1970) (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5326 (1982)).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1)(D) (includes any offense involving fraud connected with a title 11
(bankruptcy) case, fraud in the sale of securities, or felonious acts involving narcotics or other dan-
gerous drugs).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988).
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clearly what constitutes a "pattern of racketeering activity," defining a
pattern as "at least two acts of racketeering activity" (predicate acts)
within a 10-year period.'
3
Given RICO's rather ambiguous definition of "pattern," the Supreme
Court has attempted to guide the lower federal courts' efforts to develop
a more meaningful standard. In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,14 the
Supreme Court provided four clues regarding the meaning of RICO's
"pattern" requirement. 5 First, the statutory definition of "pattern of
racketeering activity" implies that while two predicate acts are necessary,
two acts alone may not be sufficient. 6 Second, the Court found that
"two isolated acts of racketeering activity," "sporadic activity," and
"proof of two acts of racketeering activity without more" are insufficient
to constitute a pattern. 7 Third, RICO's legislative history indicates a
pattern results from the combination of continuity and relationship.18
Finally, the Sedima Court indicated that the definition of "pattern of
criminal activity" in Title X of the Organized Crime Control Act
(OCCA)' 9-a different title under the same Act creating RICO-may
help in interpreting RICO's pattern requirement.20
Sedima's "clues" however, did not prove very enlightening to the
lower courts struggling with the concept of "pattern." Following
Sedima, the federal district courts and circuit courts of appeals produced
numerous and widely conflicting interpretations of RICO's "pattern" re-
quirement.21 Congress, meanwhile, did nothing to clarify the term "pat-
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
14. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
15. The four clues originate from a footnote in Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14. Justice Scalia
noted and numbered these clues in his concurring opinion in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tele-
phone, 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2906 (Scalia, J., concurring).
16. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
17. Id. RICO's legislative history supports this view. See S. REP. No. 617, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 158 (1969) (pattern not formed by "sporadic activity"); 116 CONG. Rc. 18940 (1970) (state-
ment of Sen. McClellan) (person cannot "be subjected to the sanctions of title IX simply for commit-
ting two widely separated and isolated criminal offenses").
18. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14. The requirement of continuity and relationship means sepa-
rate criminal acts must cover a continuum and must be related. Id. But cf infra note 45 (Scalia's
criticism in H.J. Inc. of the Court's continuity and relationship requirement).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (repealed 1987) ("[C]riminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces
criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of
commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated
events.").
20. 473 U.S. at 496 n. 14. But cf infra note 45 (Scalia's criticism of the Court's use of title X for
guidance in defining RICO pattern).
21. See H.J. Ina, 109 S. Ct. at 2898 n.2 (citing Roeder v. Alpha Industries, 814 F.2d 22, 30-31
1990]
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tern" through legislation.22 Thus, in an attempt to reconcile the
continuing widespread divergence in circuit positions, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. 23
In H.J. Inc., the Court reviewed an action by the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals dismissing a RICO complaint because the acts comprising the
alleged violation were not in furtherance of multiple schemes24 and
therefore were insufficient to establish a pattern of racketeering activity. 25
(1st Cir. 1987) (rejecting multiple scheme requirement; sufficient that predicates relate to one an-
other and threaten to be more than an isolated occurrence); United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d
1370, 1381-84 (2d Cir. 1989) (en banc) (rejecting multiple scheme requirement; two or more interre-
lated acts with showing ofcontinuity or threat of continuity sufficient); Barticheck v, Fidelity Union
Bank/First National State, 832 F.2d 36, 39-40 (3d Cir. 1987) (rejecting multiple scheme require-
ment; adopting case-by-case multifactor test); International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d
149, 154-55 (4th Cir. 1987) (rejecting any mechanical test; single limited scheme insufficient, but a
large continuous scheme should not escape RICO's enhanced penalties); R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc, v.
Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1985) (two related predicate acts may be sufficient); United
States v. Jennings, 842 F.2d 159, 163 (6th Cir. 1988) (two predicate acts potentially enough); Mor-
gan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975-76 (7th Cir. 1986) (refusing to accept multiile scheme
requirement as general rule; adopting multifactor test, but requiring that predicates constitute "sepa-
rate transactions"); Sun Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 193 (9th Cir. 1987)
(rejecting multiple scheme test; requiring two predicates separated in time that are not isolated
events); Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925, 928-29 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding single scheme
from which no threat of continuing criminal activity may be inferred insufficient); Bank of America
National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966, 971 (1Ith Cir. 1986) (rejecting
multiple scheme test; requiring that predicates be interrelated and not isolated events); Yellow Bus
Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 839 F.2d 782, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(requiring related acts that are not isolated events)). See also Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d
252 (8th Cir. 1986) (requiring proof of multiple illegal schemes).
Justice Scalia referred to this divergence of opinion as "the widest and most persistent circuit split
on an issue of federal law in recent memory." 109 S. Ct. at 2907. Two commentators remarked that
after the inconsistency and confusion following Sedima, "pattern" had joined the class of legal ab-
stractions where one could only say "I know it when I see it." Chepiga and LaMother, The Continu-
ing Evolution of the "Pattern" Concept in RICO Litigation: H.J Inc. and Its Inevitable Progeny, 153
Civ. RICO (PLI) 87, 110 (1989).
22. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2899 (1989).
23. 485 U.S. 958 (1988).
24. "Scheme" as used in Eighth Circuit opinions refers to a single goal or single fraudulent
effort as in "influencing MPUC Commissioners" in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,
829 F.2d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 1987) or "conversion of petroleum gas" in Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer,
785 F.2d 252, 258 (8th Cir. 1986).
25. Id. at 2898. In H.J Inc., Northwestern Bell Telephone Company customers brought a
class action under RICO, alleging that the company gave members of the Minnesota Public Utilities
Commission numerous bribes in return for the commissioners' approval of unfair and unreasonable
rates, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a)-(d). Id. at 2897. The plaintiffs sought an injunction and
treble damages under RICO's civil liability provisions, §§ 1964(a) and (c). Id. The United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota granted the telephone company's motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, 648 F. Supp. 419, 425 (D.Minn, 1986).
The district court found the plaintiffs' failure to allege multiple illegal schemes mandated dismissal
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol68/iss3/19
1990] CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that multiple schemes are not a
prerequisite to finding a pattern.26 The Court then presented an analysis
for determining what constitutes a "pattern of racketeering activity."
The Court first concluded that Congress' failure to provide a precise
definition of a "pattern of racketeering activity" indicated that the pat-
tern concept was broad27 and to be applied flexibly.2" The Court then
turned to RICO's legislative history for more specific guidance,29 and
found a congressional intent to require proof of (1) related predicates (2)
that amount to, or pose a threat of, continued criminal activity.30
To guide the lower courts in formulating a definition of "relatedness"
under RICO, the Court advised looking to the definition of a pattern of
criminal conduct in Title X of OCCA.3 1 That title provides that criminal
conduct forms a pattern if it includes acts with the same or similar pur-
poses, results, participants, victims, methods of commission, or that are
otherwise interrelated.32
under the Eighth Circuit's decision in Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986). The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, HJ. Inc. V. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 829
F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1987), stating that under Eighth Circuit precedent a single fraudulent scheme is
insufficient to establish a pattern of racketeering activity. 109 S. Ct. at 2898. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between the Eighth Circuit's "multiple scheme" interpreta-
tion and the interpretation of circuits that had rejected the multiple scheme requirement. 485 U.S.
958 (1988).
26. 109 S. Ct. at 2899. The Court also held that RICO's pattern requirement does not require
proof of an organized crime nexus, id. at 2905, and cannot be established merely by proving two
predicate acts. Id. at 2899.
27. Id. at 2899. Unlike other provisions in RICO's definitional section-which describe what
various concepts "mean"-the definition of a "pattern of racketeering activity" merely states a mini-
mum necessary condition for the existence of a pattern. Id. Section 1961(5) describes the phrase
"pattern of racketeering activity" only as "requir[ing] at least two acts of racketeering activity, one
of which occurred after [October 15, 1970] and the last of which occurred within ten years (exclud-
ing any period of imprisonment) after the commission of the prior act of racketeering activity." 18
U.S.C. 1961(5) (1988). "This definition provides an extremely low threshold for satisfying the pat-
tern" requirement, indicative of Congress' broad approach to the pattern concept.
28. Id. at 2900 (from the relaxed limits to the pattern concept as defined in § 1961(5) and the
absence of any textual identification of what sorts of patterns would satisfy § 1962, it is reasonable to
infer that Congress intended a flexible approach).
29. The Court has also looked to legislative history in past RICO cases. See, ag., Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 486-490 (1985) (opinion of the Court), 510-519 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting), 524-527 (Powell, J., dissenting); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26-29 (1983);
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-587, 589-593 (1981).
30. 109 S. Ct. at 2900. The Court merely reiterated Sedima's requirement of continuity plus
relationship. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
31. 109 S. Ct. at 2900-01. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
32. Id. at 2901, 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (repealed 1987). After quoting OCCA's pattern require-
ment, the Court stated, "[w]e have no reason to suppose that Congress had in mind for RICO's
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In defining "continuity," the Court rejected a multiple scheme require-
ment,33 stating that the concept of "scheme" was not included in the text
or legislative history of RICO,34 and that it brought a rigidity to the
available methods of proving a pattern not present in the idea of "con-
tinuity" itself.35
The Court proposed a more flexible approach, under which a plaintiff
or prosecutor need only prove continuity of racketeering or the threat of
such continuity in order to show a "threat of continuing racketeering
activity."' 36 Acknowledging the difficulty in formulating a general test
for continuity, the Court announced that the requirement could be
proven in a variety of ways under either a "closed-ended" or "open-
ended" theory.37 If the plaintiff or prosecutor could demonstrate con-
tinuity over a closed period by proving a series of related predicates ex-
tending over a substantial period of time, such proof would satisfy the
requirement.38 If the racketeering activity extended over only a brief
time period, RICO liability would then depend upon the plaintiff or pros-
ecutor establishing a threat of future continuing activity-or open-ended
continuity. 39 The Court conceded that its approach to open-ended con-
tinuity necessitated a fact-specific inquiry, but offered two examples:
predicate acts that involve a threat of repetition extending indefinitely
into the future,4' and predicates that are part of an ongoing entity's regu-
lar way of doing business.41
pattern of racketeering component any more constrained a notion of the relationships between predi-
cates that would suffice." Id. The Court provided this same hint in Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. But cf. infra note 45 (Scalia's criticism of Court's
definition of relatedness).
33. 109 S. Ct. at 2901 ("[ilt is implausible to suppose that Congress thought continuity might
be shown only by proof of multiple schemes") (emphasis in original).
34. Id. The Court stated its distaste for "introducing a new and perhaps more amorphous
concept into the analysis that has no basis in text or legislative history" (quoting Bartichek v. Fidel-
ity Union Bank/First National State, 832 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1987)).
35. 109 S. CL at 2901.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2902.
38. Id. ("Predicate acts extending over a few weeks or months and threatening no future crimi-
nal conduct do not satisfy this requirement .. "). The Court believed this "over a substantial period
of time" test reinforced Congress' concern with long-term criminal conduct. Id. But cf infra note
45 (Scalia's criticism of Court's closed-ended concept).
39. Id.
40. Id. (providing example of hoodlum selling "insurance" to storekeepers to cover window
breakage, where hood tells proprietors he will visit each month to collect "premium").
41. Id. (providing the following examples: predicates attributed to the operation of a long-term
association that exists for criminal purposes-the proverbial "organized crime;" predicates that are a
[Vol. 68:779
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The opinion hinted at the vagueness problems inherent in its "pattern"
analysis, noting that the Court could not fix in advance the concepts of
continuity and relationship with such a clarity that it would always be
apparent whether a "pattern" exists in a particular case.42 The Court
also expressed its desire for more congressional guidance: the develop-
ment of its continuity and relationship concepts "must await future
cases, absent a decision by Congress to revisit RICO to provide clearer
guidance as to the Act's intended scope." 43
In a separate concurrence,' Justice Scalia criticized the Court's pat-
tern analysis,4" but ultimately decided that the problem lay not in the
Court's efforts' to define a pattern, but in RICO's failure to provide
regular way of conducting a legitimate business that does not exist for criminal purposes; predicates
that are a regular way of conducting or participating in an ongoing and legitimate RICO
"enterprise").
42. Id. Applying its analysis to the facts ofH.J Inc., the Court held the relationship require-
ment could be satisfied because the acts of bribery were alleged to be related by a common purpose to
influence the commissioners' approval of unfair rates. Id. at 2906. The Court also concluded the
continuity requirement could be satisfied by the plaintiffs' claim of frequent predicate acts over a six-
year period (closed-ended), or by the threat of continued activity if the alleged bribes constituted the
defendant's regular way of doing business, or the regular way of conducting or participating in the
conduct of an alleged and ongoing RICO enterprise-the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission
itself (open-ended). Id. Therefore, the Court held the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Dis-
trict Court's dismissal of the claim for failure to plead "a pattern of racketeering activity," and
reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id.
43. Id. at 2902.
44. 109 S. Ct. at 2906-09 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Scalia was joined by Justices
Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Kennedy.
45. Scalia believed that the Court did little more than re-offer Sedima's four clues with only the
additional caveat that Congress intended a "flexible approach." Id. at 2907. He also criticized the
Court's continuity and relationship requirements for being garnered from merely a "snippet from the
legislative history" and for proving valueless in defining a "pattern." Id. at 2907.
Regarding the Court's concept of relatedness, Scalia noted that instead of looking to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3575(e) for guidance, normal rules of statutory construction dictate that if Congress included a
definition of pattern in OCCA but not in RICO, the Court should presume Congress intended to
exclude the application of OCCA's definition to RICO. Id. at 2907. Scalia added that § 3575(e)'s
vague text provided no help in clarifying the relatedness requirement. Id.
Turning to the Court's continuity analysis, Justice Scalia lambasted the Court's closed-ended con-
cept. After complaining that he did not understand the idea, the Justice stated that--contrary to the
Court's test-a RICO pattern should cover just a few months of racketeering activity. Otherwise,
criminals receive a free period from RICO prosecution. Id. at 2908. As for the concept of open-
ended continuity and its requirement of a "threat of continuity," Scalia stated that the Court's rejec-
tion of a multiple-scheme requirement made it more difficult for potential defendants to know
whether they are covered by RICO; the "threat of continuity" test will prove difficult both to follow
and to apply. Id. Scalia agreed, however, with the Court's holding that a RICO "pattern" does not
require proof of multiple schemes. Id. at 2909.
46. Id. at 2908 ("It is, however, unfair to be so critical of the Court's efforts, because I would be
Washington University Open Scholarship
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clear guidance on what activity is sufficient to constitute a "pattern of
racketeering activity."'47 Justice Scalia charged that H.J. Inc. added
nothing to prior Court attempts to define "pattern," but rather increased
RICO's vagueness by adding the "threat of continuity" requirement.48
Scalia, therefore, predicted that after H.J. Inc., the split in the circuits
over what constitutes a RICO pattern would continue.49 Deeming this
vagueness intolerable given the severity of RICO's penalties,50 the Justice
forecast RICO's vulnerability to a constitutional challenge for vague-
ness:51 "That the highest Court in the land has been unable to derive
from this statute anything more than today's meager guidance bodes ill
for the day when that challenge is presented." 2
The Court's decision in H.J. Inc. is significant for several reasons, and
should add to the current pressure on Congress to clarify RICO's defini-
unable to provide an interpretation of RICO that gives significantly more guidance concerning its
application.").
47. Id. (Although clear from prologue of RICO that Congress intended the word "pattern" in
the phrase "pattern of racketeering activity" to require something more than the mere existence of
multiple predicate acts, "[what that something more is, is beyond me.").
48. See supra note 45 for Scalia's criticism of the Court's "threat of continuity" requirement.
49. 109 S. Ct. at 2908.
50. RICO's criminal penalties include fines and/or imprisonment of up to 20 years (or for life if
the violation is based on a predicate act for which the maximum penalty includes life imprisonment),
and forfeiture of any interest in property acquired through racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1963
(1988).
51. The federal constitutional doctrine of vagueness requires a penal statute to define clearly its
prohibitions or risk violations of the fifth amendment guaranty against deprivations of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)
(vague laws fail to give fair warning and open the door for arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment). A statute that fails to give such fair warning is deemed "void for vagueness." Id, In the
absence of first amendment considerations, vagueness challenges cannot be decided generally but
must be determined as applied to the facts of a particular case. See United States v. Mazurie, 419
U.S. 544, 550 (1975) ("It is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not
iniolve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts at hand."). See also
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 (1982) (person to whom statute constitutionally can be
applied is prohibited from "challenging that statute on ground it may conceivably be applied uncon-
stitutionally to others in situations not before the Court"). The applicable standard requires that a
statute be found unconstitutionally vague if it "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair
notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute." United States v. Harris, 347 U.S.
612, 617 (1954). This vagueness standard is based on the principle that "no man shall be held
criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed." Id.
Applied to RICO's "pattern" requirement, the vagueness doctrine might invalidate RICO for
failure to give persons of ordinary intelligence fair notice that their conduct constituted a "pattern of
racketeering."
52. Id. at 2909.
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tion of a "pattern of racketeering activity." 3 First, the Court's rejection
of a multiple scheme requirement should make it easier for plaintiffs to
plead and prove private RICO actions, resulting in the filing of more civil
RICO cases and increased exposure for legitimate businesses.54 This re-
sult could lead Congress to reconsider whether it really wants an in-
creased use of RICO for private actions.55
Second, the Court in H.J. Inc. once again56 openly expressed its desire
that Congress rewrite the statute, citing its own difficulty in determining
Congress' intended meaning of RICO's "pattern of racketeering activity"
requirement.5 7
53. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
54. See, ag., RICO Attorneys Respond to Court's Opinion in HJ. Ina, 5 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA)
No. 6, at 3 (July 4, 1989) [hereinafter Attorneys Respond] (comments of Philip Lacovara, Chairman
of the Coalition for RICO Reform) (Court's definition of "pattern" will rule out only one narrow
category of cases in which a pattern is based on several nearly simultaneous predicate acts). But see
109 S. Ct. at 2899 (Court also rejects a broad interpretation of pattern whereby pattern could be
established merely by proving two predicate acts).
Notwithstanding the concern over an increase in RICO cases filed, such an increase does not
necessarily lead to an increase in successful RICO claims. See eg., Attorneys Respond, supra, at 4
(comments of Andrew Weissman) (since Sedima, only one of every three RICO complaints survives
a motion to dismiss, and H. Inc will decrease that number further).
55. See Attorneys Respond, supra note 54, at 3 (comments of Irvin Nathan). See also Rehnquist
Urges Congress to Curtail Federal Civil Suits, 4 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 3 (Feb. 14, 1989)
(Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a speech to American Bar Association's House of Delegates, suggests
Congress should curtail sharply certain civil actions under RICO to relieve serious overloading of
federal court system). But cf Bill to Limit Civil RICO Scope Introduced in House, Senate, 4 Civ.
RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 2 (Feb. 28, 1989) (In response to proposed RICO Reform Act of 1989,
which would eliminate treble damages where state or federal securities law provided a remedy, con-
sumer advocate Ralph Nader stated, "[t]his legislation weakening RICO comes at the worst possible
time-in the middle of an unprecedented corporate crime wave." Nader cited recent episodes of
savings and loan fraud, commodities fraud, and Pentagon procurement scandals, and concluded,
"[t]his is no time for members of Congress to be soft on corporate crime").
56. See, eg., Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499 (Court's opinion that only congressional reform can miti-
gate RICO's breadth).
57. 109 S. Ct. at 2899. The Court's attempt at clarification has itself met with much criticism
from the bar. See Attorneys Respond, supra note 54, at 3 (comments of Quentin Riegel) (four years
after the Court in Sedima placed the responsibility for clarification of RICO firmly on Congress, the
situation has gotten worse-in Scalia's opinion, "intolerable"); id. (comments of Mike Hunter) (leg-
islative action needed to clarify congressional intent because H.J Inc. makes a confusing situation
even worse); id. (H. Inc. decision shows Court lacks sufficient guidance from Congress); id. at 4
(comments of Tom Thomas) (H.J. Inc. a "shovel case" in which Court said to Congress, "We're not
going to change it. You wrote it, you change it").
The vagueness of the Court's decision is demonstrated further by the disagreement in the legal
community over whether H.J. Inc. is good or bad for legitimate business and the defense bar. Com-
pare Attorneys Response, supra note 54, at 3-4 (comments of Andrew Weissman) (noting belief of
RICO amendment's proponents that H.J. Inc. broadened RICO's pattern requirement and will lead
to more suits and greater exposure for business) with id. (comments of Andrew Weissman) (belief
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Third, Justice Scalia in his concurrence threw down the gauntlet to the
defense bar to challenge RICO complaints on constitutional grounds.58
This development should lead to inevitable attack on RICO's pattern re.
quirement as unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process.59
Given that RICO has thus far been able to withstand constitutional chal-
lenges,' and that Scalia's vagueness concerns were not adopted by a ma-
jority of the Court, however, those anticipating RICO's invalidation on
vagueness grounds should not become too optimistic. Nonetheless, this
combination of the above three ramifications, each highlighting the
shortcomings inherent in the current definition of a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity, may lead Congress to grant the Court's wish and to clarify at
last RICO's key "pattern of racketeering activity" requirement.
B. Forfeiting Attorney's Fees
Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
that HJ. Inc. will limit the use of RICO because, in addition to invalidating the restrictive multiple
scheme requirement, it also cut back on the broader definitions of "pattern" prevalent in circuits
where any two related predicate acts were sufficient to establish a pattern) and id. at 4 (belief that the
examples the Court provided of sufficient "continuity," each of which involved either open-ended
conduct or a showing that the offenses constituted the entity's ongoing business, are more restrictive
than the existing approaches in a number of jurisdictions, including the Second, Third, Fifth, Ninth
and D.C. Circuits). See supra note 21 for the various circuit's current "pattern" requirements.
58. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. See, eg., Attorneys Respond, supra note 54,
at 3 (comments of John C. Fricano) (predicting that the defense bar will "pick up this gauntlet with
a vengeance," leading to a flurry of amended complaints and delays in settlements).
59. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. See also Attorneys Respond, supra note 54, at 3
(comments of Mark Reinhardt) (HJ. Inc. attorney's belief that in light of Scalia's opinion, defense
counsel would be committing malpractice if they did not challenge RICO's constitutionality),
60. Prior to HJ. Inc., courts universally rejected vagueness challenges to RICO's "pattern of
racketeering requirement." See, e.g., United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 381 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 943 (1982) (a person of average intelligence "could not help but realize that
they would be criminally liable for participating in 'any enterprise'. . . 'through a pattern of racke-
teering activity' "); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 441-42 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1105 (1975) ("Pattern of racketeering activity" not unconstitutionally vague as applied to two
offenses indictable under interstate transportation statute); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp.
609, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (pattern element not vague because elements of required predicate offenses
are clearly defined), aff'd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
Several vagueness challenges to RICO's pattern requirement have met defeat even after H.J. Inc.
See United States v. Angiulo, Nos. 86-1331, 89-1212, 89-1800 (1st Cir. March 8, 1990) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Usapp. file) (RICO "pattern" element not void for vagueness; persons of ordinary
intelligence would realize that murder conspiracies and gambling and loansharking operations of an
organized crime family constituted a pattern of racketeering activity); Minpeco, S.A. v. Hunt, 724 F.
Supp. 259, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (refusing to follow Scalia's concurrence in H.J. Inc., noting that it
spoke only for three other Justices and did not constitute a formal development of the law).
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(RICO)6 1 and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute (CCE),62 a
convicted criminal defendant forfeits to the United States any property
derived from the criminal violation.63 The Department of Justice main-
tains that "property" includes property used or intended to be used to
pay attorney's fees." Accordingly, prosecutors often seek restraining or-
ders preventing transfer of such property to attorneys as payment for
legal services.65 Alternatively, prosecutors seek post-conviction forfei-
61. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988). Con-
gress enacted RICO as title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84
Stat. 922.
62. Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988). The CCE provision was
enacted as a part of title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.
Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 408, 84 Stat. 1265.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988) (RICO forfeiture provision); 21 U.S.C § 853(a) (1988) (CCE
forfeiture provision). CCE provides a good example:
Any person convicted of a violation of this subehapter ... punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year shall forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any provision of
State law-
(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, di-
rectly or indirectly, as the result of such violation;
(2) any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to
commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such violation[.]
21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988).
64. Note, Attorney Fee Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984: If It Works,
Don't Fix It, 63 Notre Dame L. Rev. 535, 536 (1988) (citing UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
U.S. ATroRNEys' MANUAL, §§ 9-111.000-.700 (1986), reprinted in 38 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3001-
08 (Oct. 2, 1985)). See also, Brickey, Attorneys'Fee Forfeitures: On Defining "What" and "When"
and Distinguishing "Ought"from "Is", 36 EMORY L.J. 761, 762 (1987).
65. See Note, supra note 64, at 536. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1988), all right title, and
interest in property subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) vests in the United States at the
time the act giving rise to the forfeiture occurs. This provision also allows the prosecution to attack
property transferred to third parties unless they are bona fide purchasers for value without reason-
able cause to believe the property was subject to forfeiture at the time of purchase. Id.
The statute allows for an injunction or restraining order to be issued in order to preserve the
availability of the property for forfeiture and prevents the transfer of funds to an attorney, even to
pay for the legal services. This restraining order can be issued after an indictment or information has
been filed which charges a RICO violation and alleges that the property will be subject to forfeiture
upon conviction. Alternatively, a restraining order can be issued prior to the filing of an indictment
if, after notice to the defendant and an opportunity for a hearing, the prosecutor can show (i) a
substantial probability the U.S. will prevail on the issue of forfeiture and a failure to issue the order
will result in the destruction of the property or that the property will somehow be made unavailable
for forfeiture; and (ii) the need to preserve the availability through the order outweighs the hardship
to the defendant. 18 U.S.C § 1963(d)(1) (1988).
The prosecutor can also seek a temporary restraining order, issued without notice or opportunity
for hearing, if the prosecutor can show probable cause the property would be subject to forfeiture
upon conviction and that notice will jeopardize the availability of the property for forfeiture. 18
U.S.C. § 1963(d)(2) (1988).
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ture of attorney's fees already transferred to counsel. 66
The defense bar has raised a number of responses to such action. De-
fense attorneys argue: (1) Congress impliedly intended these statutes to
exempt attorney's fees from forfeiture;67 (2) these statutes, interpreted to
include attorney's fees, violate a defendant's sixth amendment right to
counsel of choice,68 because no attorney will represent a RICO or CCE
defendant knowing that the fee is potentially forfeitable; 69 and (3) forfei-
ture of attorney's fees violates a defendant's right to a fair trial under the
due process clause of the fifth amendment.70
L Statutory Construction of Forfeiture Provisions: United States v.
Monsanto
Under the CCE, a court legitimately may issue a pretrial restraining
order to preserve a defendant's assets for forfeiture. The lower courts
were in disagreement7 over whether the statute72 should be interpreted
to allow a defendant to use these restrained assets73 to pay legitimate
attorney's fees.74 The Supreme Court recently resolved the dispute in
United States v. Monsanto.7" The Court held that the forfeiture provi-
sions of CCE contains no exemption, express or implied, for assets with
66. Note, supra note 64, at 536.
67. Wade, Feds in Your Pocket Attorney's Fee Forfeiture and Attorney Disqualification Under
RICO, 10 Crim. Just. J. 217, 221 (1988).
68. Id.
69. Brickey, supra note 64, at 769.
70. Wade, supra note 67, at 221-22.
71. Compare United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988) (no statutory exemption
for attorney's fees) with United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1474 (5th Cir. 1986) (exemption for
attorney's fees authorized by statute).
72. The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 (CFA) added or amended forfeiture provisions
for two classes of violations under federal law, RICO offenses and CCE offenses. Comprehensive
Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 301, 98 Stat. 1837, 2040 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 853 (1988)). The CFA is a criminal forfeiture statute; civil forfeitures are covered under 21 U.S.C
881 (1988).
73. The property is seized or frozen (restrained) prior to trial and before any judicial determina-
tion of the defendant's guilt or innocence. See supra notes 63 (language of the CCE's forfeiture
provision) and 65.
74. All courts agree the restrained assets cannot be used to pay "sham" attorney's fees. See,
e.g., United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1348 (D. Colo. 1985) ("An attorney who receives
funds in return for services legitimately rendered operates at arm's length and not as part of an
artifice or sham to avoid forfeiture . . . . This does not, however, mean that assets transferred to a
lawyer as part of a sham will not be subject to forfeiture").
75. - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
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which a defendant wishes to retain an attorney.76
In Monsanto, the defendant was indicted under various RICO, CCE,
narcotics,7" and firearm charges.78 The indictment sought forfeiture of
assets amassed through illegal activity.79 The district court entered an ex
parte restraining order prohibiting Monsanto from transferring or en-
cumbering these assets.80 Monsanto moved to vacate the order, but the
district court refused.81 Monsanto appealed and a panel of the Second
Circuit held that the attorney's fees were not exempt from forfeiture.82
76. Monsanto, - U.S.-, 109 S. Ct. at 2665.
77. The indictment alleged conspiracy to distribute narcotics, in violation of 21 U.S.C § 846
(1982). United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2665
(1989).
78. Monsanto was indicted on four counts of illegal possession of firearms under 18 U.S.C.
Appendix § 12022(a)(1982). This provision was later repealed. Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 76 & n.l.
See Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104(b), 100 Stat. 449, 459 (1986).
79. The assets included real property valued at $365,000 and $35,000 in cash. The $35,000 in
cash were not included in the restraining order. The record does not disclose whether Monsanto had
the $35,000 in his possession, or what impact it might have had on his ability to retain counsel of
choice. Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 76 n.2.
80. This order was made pursuant to the CFA. 21 U.S.C § 853(e)(1)(A) (1988) provides:
(1) Upon application of the United States, the court may enter a restraining order or in-
junction, require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond, or take any other action
to preserve the availability of property described in subsection (a) of [§ 853] for forfeiture
under this section-
(A) Upon the filing of an indictment or information charging a violation ...for which
criminal forfeiture may be ordered under [§ 853] and alleging that the property with re-
spect to which the order is sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture
under this section[.J
81. Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 76. Monsanto argued that Congress did not intend the CFA provi-
sions to apply to assets needed to pay legitimate attorney's fees and, even if the statute did apply to
those assets, it would violate his sixth amendment right to counsel of choice. Id.
Nevertheless, the district court acknowledged the result of the order was to render Monsanto
indigent. Id. at 76, n.2. The court refused to hold the forfeiture provisions unconstitutional as
applied to attorney's fees or to hold Congress intended attorney's fees to be exempt from the provi-
sion; it did allow Monsanto to use the restrained assets to pay counsel of choice pursuant to "allow-
ance" rates established by the Criminal Justice Act. Id. at 76.
That Act provides:
Any attorney appointed pursuant to this section ... shall, at the conclusion of the repre-
sentation or any segment thereof, be compensated at a rate not exceeding $60 per hour for
time expended in court or before a United States Magistrate and $40 per hour for time
reasonably expended out of court. . . . 18 U.S.C 3006A(d)(1) (1988).
82. Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 80. The court found that the plain language of the statute contains
no exemption for attorney's fees; the plain language must prevail because the legislative history is
ambiguous. Id. at 78-80. The panel held, however, that notice and a pretrial hearing are constitu-
tionally required prior to government restraint of assets needed to pay attorney's fees. Id. at 83. The
government had the burden of showing probable cause that the assets would be subject to forfeiture.
Id. The case was remanded prior to its rehearing en banc, and the district court, after holding the
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On rehearing en banc, a sharply divided courtsa vacated its earlier opin-
ion and ordered the district court to permit Monsanto to use the re-
strained assets to pay legitimate attorney's fees.8
The Supreme Court granted certiorari85 because the Second Circuit's
decision created a conflict among the Courts of Appeals over the statu-
tory and constitutional issues.86 The Court used the Monsanto case to
decide the statutory issue,87 and a companion case, Caplin & Drysdale
Chartered v. United States,8 to answer the constitutional question.
The Court reasoned that the language of section 853(a) is plain and
unambiguous.89 The section provides that a person subject to the provi-
required hearing, concluded that the government had met its burden. Monsanto, - U.S. -, 109 S.
Ct. at 2661.
Other courts that have required a similar prior-restraint hearing have diverged over the govern-
ment's burden of proof. Compare United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 915 (3d Cir. 1987)
("[G]overnment must demonstrate that it is likely to convince a jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, of
two things: one, that the defendant is guilty of violating the [CCE] statute and two, that the profits
. . . are subject to forfeiture[.]") with United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1470 (5th Cir. 1986)
(indictment itself is a "strong showing" for continuing the restraint order although it is not irrebut-
table).
The Supreme Court did not address whether due process requires a hearing before imposition of a
pretrial restraining order because Monsanto received a hearing. United States v. Monsanto, - U.S.
-, 109 S. Ct. at 2666 n.10. The Court, therefore, also did not address the government's burden of
proof at such a hearing, although the Court did conclude that the restraint of Monsanto's assets,
based on probable cause, was proper. Id. The government's burden of proof for a temporary re-
straining order is demonstration of "probable cause to believe that the property. . . would, in event
of conviction, be subject to forfeiture. . . and that provision of notice [to the party against whom
the order is sought] will jeopardize the availability of the property for forfeiture." 21 U.S,C
§ 853(e)(2) (1988). See 18 U.S.C. 1963(d)(2) (1988) (parallel RICO forfeiture provision).
83. The en bane court voted 8-4 in favor of modifying the order. The majority was divided as
to the proper approach to use in resolving the question. Three of the judges believed the order
violated the sixth amendment, United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1402 (2nd Cir. 1988) (per
curiam), rev'd, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989); three questioned it on statutory grounds, id. at
1405-06; and two held it violated the due process clause. Id. at 1411-12.
84. Id. at 1402.
85. - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988).
86. See, eg., United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988) (by its language, the
statute applies to attorney fees; application to attorneys fees does not violate sixth amendment);
United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988) (statute applies to attorney's fees; not
unconstitutional); United States v. Jones, 837 F.2d 1332, rehg granted, 844 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1988)
(property pledged by defendant to attorney for services exempt from statute).
87. Monsanto, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. at 2665. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
88. 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989) (decided the same day). See infra notes 102-132 and accompanying
text.
89. For the statute's language, see supra note 63. In construing a statute, the Court first looks
to the language itself and need not look further if the language is plain and unambiguous. United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981). The Court pointed out that Congress could not have chosen
stronger or clearer language to express its intent. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2662.
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sion "shall forfeit. any property" derived from the criminal activity,
and that upon conviction, the court shall order forfeiture of this prop-
erty.90 The statute provides a broad definition of property when describ-
ing those assets subject to forfeiture.91 The Court concluded that there
was no basis from which to exempt assets intended for use as attorney's
fees from the mandatory nature of the statute and its broad definition of
property. 92 It confirmed this understanding with legislative history and
comparisons with other sections of the statute.93
Although section 853(a) contains no express exemption for attorney's
fees, the defendant contended that the restraining provision, section
853(e)(1)(A),94 should be interpreted to include this exemption. The de-
90. The court, in imposing sentence on such person, "shall order .. , that the person forfeit to
the United States all property described in this subsection." 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988) (emphasis
added). The Court relied on the mandatory language used by Congress. Monsanto, - U.S. -, 109
S. Ct. at 2662.
91. Id. The statute defines the assets subject to forfeiture as: "real property... tangible and
intangible personal property, including rights, privileges, interests claims, and securities." 21 U.S.C
§ 853(b) (1988).
92. Monsanto, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. at 2662. Even the amicus curiae brief for the American
Bar Association, arguing against forfeiture, conceded the statute broadly covers all property ac-
quired through illegal activity and could find no specific exemption for attorney's fees. Id.
In spite of this plain language, the defendant urged the Court to create an exemption for attorney's
fees because the statute does not include them expressly in the forfeiture provision. See supra notes
63, 90. For the definition of property, see supra note 91. The Court quickly dismissed this argument
by analogy. The statute and the legislative history do not expressly include money to pay stock-
holder's fees, laundry bills, or country club dues as subject to forfeiture; yet none seriously could
argue for these fees' exemption. Id. at 2663.
93. Congress has refused to act on repeated suggestions by the defense bar for the exemption
urged by Monsanto. See, eg., Attorney's Fees Forfeiture: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 148-213 (1986), cited in Monsanto, - U.S. - n.9, 109 S. CL at
2662 n.9; Forfeiture Issues Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Crime of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 187-242 (1985) cited in Monsanto, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. at 2662
n.9.
Additionally, in the same law which adopted § 853, Congress expressly exempted attorney's fees
from forfeiture in the provisions concerning collateral profits (e.g., from books, movies or television
productions about the crime). See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3681(C)(1)(b)(ii) (1988). This inclusion clearly indi-
cated to the Court that Congress understood what it was doing when it failed to include a similar
exemption in § 853; Congress intended attorney's fees to be subject to forfeiture. Monsanto, - U.S.
-, 109 S. Ct. at 2664.
Finally, Monsanto urged the Court to invoke a general cannon of statutory construction which
admonishes courts to construe statutes to avoid constitutional questions and problems. See, eg.,
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979). The Court pointed out that these
cannons only apply in close cases or when the statutory language is ambiguous. In the case at bar,
the statute is clear, comprehensive, and unambiguous; these cannons of statutory construction,
therefore, have no application. Monsanto, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. at 2664.
94. Upon application of the United States, the court may enter a restraining order or injunc-
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fendant argued that the permissive language of this section95 allows the
district court to employ traditional principles of equity-balancing of
hardships-before actually restraining the defendant's assets.96 This bal-
ancing test would tip the scales in favor of the defendant's use of his
assets for attorney's fees.97 The Court rejected this argument because it
failed to consider the categorical nature of section 853(a) and how the
entire statute works as a unit. 98
Any discretion given district courts in section 853(e) relates only to
how they preserve the availability of the property for forfeiture.99 There
is no exemption from section 853's forfeiture or pre-trial restraining or-
der provisions for assets that a defendant wishes to use to pay attorney's
fees. The purpose of the statute was to enforce the adage "crime does not
pay.''t0t Congress did not intend to modify this saying to read "crime
tion, . . .or take any other action to preserve the availability of property described in subsection (a)
of [§ 853] for forfeiture under this section:
(A) upon the filing of an indictment or information charging a violation. . . for which
criminal forfeiture may be ordered under [§ 853] and alleging that the property with re-
spect to which the order is sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture
under this section[.]
21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
95. Section 853(e)(1)(A) uses the permissive language "may" in describing the courts' power to
issue a restraining order or injunction. See supra note 94. Section 853(a), however, mandates the
forfeiture of assets derived from the criminal activity through the use of the verb "shall." See supra
note 63.
96. Monsanto, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. at 2664-65.
97. Judge Winter made this argument in his concurrence in the Second Circuit's en banc opin-
ion. United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1406 (2d Cir. 1988) (Winter, J., concurring). Judge
Winter further concluded that, notwithstanding § 853(c), the government could not subsequently
seize money actually used to pay attorney's fees. The Supreme Court rejected Winter's conclusion
because it would nullify § 853(c), which provides that "all right, title, and interest in [forfeitable]
property. . . vests in the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to the forfei-
ture[.J" 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988). Monsanto, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. at 2665. The Court refused to
allow the defendant to use governmental property for his own private purposes. Id.
98. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2665. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
99. Id. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) (1988), supra note 94. the trial court may enter a restraining
order if the government requests one. It need not enter one on its own initiative. The district court
need not enter a restraining order if a bond or some other means is available to preserve the availabil-
ity of the property for forfeiture. Therefore, § 853(e) is not mandatory. This section, however, does
not affect the type of property subject to forfeiture, see supra note 91, nor the requirement that the
court order forfeiture upon conviction, see supra note 63. Monsanto, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. at 2665.
100. Monsanto, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. at 2665. The congressional purpose behind the CCE was
to remove an incentive for crime by forcing the forfeiture of all assets acquired through criminal
activity. This forfeiture attempts to destroy the economic base of the criminal organization. With-
out the forfeiture provisions, the criminal organization easily continues, simply replacing the con-
victed individual. See S. Rep. No. 98-224, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1983) ("Profit is the motivation
for this criminal activity, and it is through economic power that it is sustained and grows, . . . [The
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does not pay, except for attorney's fees."' 0 1
2. Constitutionality of Forfeiture Provisions: Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered v. United States
The lower courts have also disagreed over whether either the sixth'0 2
or fifth 10 3 amendment prohibits Congress from subjecting attorney's fees
to forfeiture. The Supreme Court recently answered these questions in
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States."° There the Court held
that the failure of the CCE's forfeiture provision to exempt attorney's
fees from forfeiture did not render the statute unconstitutional under
conviction of individual racketeers and drug dealers would be of only limited effectiveness if the
economic power bases of criminal organizations or enterprises were left intact .. "). See also Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, Report on Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, S. REP. No. 98-225,
98th Cong., Ist Sess. 191 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEWS 3182, 3374.
Cf. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 28 (1983) (the Court, construing RICO: "The broader
goal [of RICO] was to remove the profit from organized crime by separating the racketeer from his
dishonest gains.").
101. Monsanto, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. at 2665.
102. The sixth amendment provides in relevant part that "[i]n all criminal prosections, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to . . .have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." The right to
counsel includes the right to a fair opportunity to secure counsel of defendant's choice. Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932).
This right is conceivably restricted by Congress' attempt in the CCE to restrain assets intended for
use in securing counsel. Compare United States v. Unit No. 7 & Unit No. 8 of Shop in the Grove
Condominium, 853 F.2d 1445 (8th Cir. 1988) (statute so interpreted violates sixth amendment) and
United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir. 1987) (en bane) (same), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2457
(1989) and United States v. Truglio, 660 F. Supp. 103 (N.D. W.Va. 1987) (statute interpreted to
exempt attorney's fees because literal reading would violate sixth amendment) and United States v.
Estevez, 645 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Wis. 1986) (same) and United States v. Figueroa, 645 F. Supp. 453
(W.D. Pa. 1986) (same) and United States v. lanniello, 644 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same)
and United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Col. 1985) with United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d
1343 (11th Cir. 1989) (statute so interpreted does not violate sixth amendment) and United States v.
Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988) (same) and United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485
(10th Cir. 1988) (same); and In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d
637 (4th cir. 1988) (en banc) (same), aff'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 109 S. Ct.
2646 (1989). See also supra notes 68-69.
103. The fifth amendment guarantees that "[n]o person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ...." The due process clause requires a "balance of forces
between the accused and his accuser." Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470,474 (1973). The petitioner
in Monsanto argued that forfeiture of attorney's fees impermissibly would upset the balance of forces
by allowing a prosecutor selectively to exclude skilled defense counsel. Caplin & Drysdale, Charted
v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989) (quoting Brief for petitioner at 43-44). See also Wade, Feds
In Your Pocket: Attorney's Fee Forfeiture and Attorney Disqualification Under RICO, 10 Crim. Just.
J. 217 (1988).
104. - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
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either the sixth or fifth amendment. 10 5
In Caplin & Drysdale, Christopher Reckmeyer was charged with run-
ning a massive drug importation and distribution scheme in violation of
the CCE.10 6 The district court entered a restraining order'01 forbidding
Reckmeyer from transferring any of the potentially forfeitable assets.108
Notwithstanding the restraining order, the defendant paid the law firm
Caplin & Drysdale for pre-indictment legal services. 0 9 The defendant
subsequently entered a plea agreement.110 In accordance with the plea
agreement, the district court entered an order forfeiting virtually all of
the defendant's assets, including those used to pay attorney's fees.'11
Caplin & Drysdale filed a petition seeking an adjudication of its third-
party interest in the assets." 2 The firm argued that the statute's failure
to provide an exemption from forfeiture for assets used to pay an attor-
ney rendered the legislation unconstitutional." 3 The district court
agreed and granted the relief sought.114 The Court of Appeals reversed,
finding the statute constitutional.' 15
Before the Supreme Court, Caplin & Drysdale claimed that the statute
placed an impermissible burden on the defendant's sixth amendment
rights because the burden on the defendant's right to counsel of his
105. Id. at 2656, 2657.
106. Id. at 2649. Reckmeyer plead guilty to violating 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982 & Supp. V (1987)),
by engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191,
1193 (E.D. Va. 1986).
107. Id. The District Court acted pursuant to the pretrial restraining order provision 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(e)(1)(A) (1988). See supra note 80.
108. Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2649.
109. Id. at 2650.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. Caplin and Drysdale filed the petition pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B), under
which third parties may petition for a hearing to adjudicate their interest in the forfeited assets.
113. The firm based this argument on the sixth amendment. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191,
1193-94 (E.D. Va. 1986).
114. Id. at 1195. After finding that the statute's forfeiture provisions did not encompass attor-
ney's fees, the district court stated in dictum that the statute violated the sixth amendment by de-
priving defendant of his right to obtain counsel of his choice, and by creating conflicts of interest
between defendants and his counsel. Id. at 1196. The court also asserted that the statute would
violate the fifth amendment under the government's reading, by upsetting the balance of powers
between defendant and the government. Id. at 1197-98.
115. Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. CL at 2650. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit first
heard the case as United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987), in which it affirmed the trial
court. The Fourth Circuit then agreed to hear the case en banc, and reversed its previous panel
decision. In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988)
(en bane), aff'd sub. nor., Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
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choice outweighed the government's interest in the forfeitable assets.116
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the forfeiture statute does
not impermissibly burden a defendant's sixth amendment right to retain
counsel of his choice.1 17
The Court reasoned that no sixth amendment violation results if the
possibility of forfeiture prevents the defendant's preferred attorney from
taking the defendant's case."1  The holding is grounded on the assertion
that an impecunious defendant has no right to counsel of choice.1 9
From this principle, the Court noted first that a defendant has no right to
use assets that do not belong to him.12 Under the forfeiture statute, title
to the forfeitable assets vests in the government as of the date of the
criminal act.12 Second, the Court reasoned that even if forfeiture of as-
sets impairs a defendant's ability to hire counsel, it does not render the
action unconstitutional. The full exercise of many constitutional rights
116. Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2651, 2653. "[Ihe right to retain counsel of one's choos-
ing is not absolute,. .. [but] must be carefully balanced against the public's interest in the orderly
administration of justice." Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir. 1981). See also United
States v. Phillips, 699 F.2d 798, 801-02 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 488-
89 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
117. Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2655-56.
118. Id. at 2652-53. The Court argued that defendant possessing sufficient non-forfeitable assets
can still hire the attorney of his choice. Id. at 2652. Even a defendant with only forfeitable assets
may be able to hire the attorney of his choice on the hope of recovering potentially forfeitable assets.
Id.
119. Id. at 2651-52.
120. By analogy, the Court reasoned that the government does not violate the sixth amendment
if it seizes the proceeds of a bank robbery and refuses to permit the defendant to use them to pay for
his defense. Id. at 2653. Petitioner sought to distinguish this situation by arguing that the bank's
claim to the robbery proceeds rests on "pre-existing property rights," while the Government's claim
rests on a "penal statute," which is merely a mechanism for preventing fraudulent conveyances. Id.
The Court rejected this argument, finding the government's property rights under the relation-back
provision substantial. Under that provision, "[a]ll right, title and interest in property [described in
§ 853(a)] vests in the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture...." 21
U.S.C § 853(c) (1988).
121. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988). See also 18 U.S.C 1963(c) (1988) (RICO relation-back provi-
sion). Because the language in the RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions are essentially identical, the
courts have freely considered the interpretation of one as applying to the other. Wade, Feds in Your
Pocket: Attorney's Fee Forfeiture and Attorney Disqualification Under RICO, 10 Crim. Just. J. 217,
220 (1988) (citing United States v. Figueroa, 643 F. Supp. 453, 455 (W.D. Pa. 1986)). Caplin &
Drysdale did not claim that Congress lacked the power to vest title in the government, a power long
recognized by the courts. Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2653. See United States v. Stowell, 133
U.S. 1 (1890) (operation of a similar forfeiture provision for violation of Internal Revenue Code
vested all right, title, and interest in United States).
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often depends on a defendant's financial wherewithal;122 likewise, forfei-
ture only impairs a defendant's ability to exercise fully his right to coun-
sel. 123 A defendant may no more use someone else's assets to protect his
sixth amendment rights than use them to protect any other constitutional
right. 124
Caplin & Drysdale also sought to minimize the government's interest
in forfeiture. Recognizing that the purpose of forfeiture is to dispossess
from drug dealers the proceeds of their wrong-doing, the defendant pro-
.posed that this purpose has been achieved once the proceeds have been
paid to an attorney, diminishing the government's continued interest in
forfeiture. 125 The Court, however, found other substantial government
interests in the proceeds: forfeited proceeds may be used to support law
enforcement 126 or returned to those wrongfully deprived of them. 127 The
government also has a substantial interest in lessening the economic
power of organized crime and drug enterprises-an interest furthered by
the deprivation of expensive legal counsel. 128
The Supreme Court also refused to find fee forfeiture a facial violation
of the due process clause of the fifth amendment.1 29 Caplin & Drysdale
argued that fee forfeiture was a facial violation because prosecutors
wrongfully may attempt to impose forfeiture on persons who should not
be subjected to that punishment.13 0 The Court rejected this argument,
122. The Court noted the exercise of the right to speak, practice one's religion, or travel, depend




126. Id. See 28 U.S.C. 524(c) (1982 & Supp. III (1987)) (establishing the Department of Justice
Assets Forfeiture Fund).
127. Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2654. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) (1988). Where the
government pursues this restitutionary end, its interest in forfeiture is substantial. Id.
128. Id. at 2654-55. A major purpose of the RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions was to lessen
the economic power of organized crime and drug enterprises. Id. at 2654 (citing, Russello v. United
States, 464 U.S. 16, 27-28 (1983)). See supra note 100. The Court posited that part of organized
crime's economic power manifests itself in the ability to retain high-priced legal services. Id. at 2655.
129. Id. at 2656-57. The Caplin & Drysdale court noted that, in the context of this case, it was
unsure whether the fifth amendment added any protection other than that provided by sixth amend-
ment. "[W]hile '[t]he Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses... it
defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth Amend-
ment.'" Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984)).
130. Id. at 2657. According to this argument, a prosecutor might wrongfully append a charge of
forfeiture to a RICO indictment, and thereby exclude any defense counsel that would be skilled
adversaries. Caplin & Drysdale argued that this would upset the balance of power between the
government and the accused in violation of the fifth amendment. Caplin & Drysdale further argued
[Vol. 68:779
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reasoning that the Constitution does not forbid the imposition of an
otherwise permissible criminal sanction-such as forfeiture-merely be-
cause in some cases it may be abused.13' Although the Court refused to
find the statute a per se violation of due process, it left open the possibil-
ity that a defendant may prevail on a claim that the statute, as applied,
violates his due process rights.'32
3. Conclusion
What effect will the Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale decisions have
on the law?' 33 The Monsanto opinion effectively puts to rest the question
whether the forfeiture provisions include assets that the defendant in-
tends to use to pay attorney's fees.' 34 The Caplin & Drysdale opinion
forecloses challenges to these provisions on the grounds that they per se
violate the sixth amendment 35 or due process clause. 136  Other legal
challenges to these provisions, however, loom on the horizon. For in-
stance, the provisions may be open to a challenge based on the first
amendment. The defendant's association with counsel to communicate
ideas in the courtroom should require courts to subject the provisions to
the rigors of strict scrutiny under the first amendment. 37  A fourth
amendment challenge based on process due for seizure of property has
that this imbalance left the statute per se unconstitutional, because specific instances of prosecutional
misconduct would be virtually impossible to prove. Id.
131. "'The fact that the... Act might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of
circumstances is insufficient to render it... invalid.'" 109 S. Ct. at 2657 (quoting United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
132. Due process claims of prosecutorial misconduct remain cognizable in specific cases. Id. at
2657. In this case, petitioner made no such allegation. Id.
133. The decisions have already invoked a reaction from the defense bar. The National Associa-
tion of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) has unveiled a program to counteract the impact of
these decisions on the law. The NACDL is calling for the appointment of a National Task Force on
the Preservation of the Adversary System, composed of criminal-defense lawyers and constitutional
scholars, to lessen the impact of attorney-fee decisions. A second task force will lobby Congress to
amend the provisions. The NACDL has requested a conference with the Department of Justice to
develop clearer forfeiture guidelines. Additionally, the NACDL is calling for a massive public edu-
cation program on how Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale abridge individual rights. Fricker, Dirty
Money 75 A.B.A. J. 60, 66 (Nov. 1989).
134. See supra notes 65-101 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 116-128 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 129-131 and accompanying text.
137. See Winick, Forfeiture of Attorney's Fees Under RICO and CCE and the Right to Counsel of
Choice: The Constitutional Dilemma and How to Avoid it, 43 U. Miami L. Rev. 765 (1989).
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also been suggested. 13
8
The desirability of including attorney's fees in the forfeiture provisions
as a matter of social policy will continue to be the subject of debate. The
Justice Department maintains that fairness dictates there is no reason to
place the drug dealer in a better position than an indigent defendant sim-
ply because he has economic power resulting from his ill-gotten gains.139
The defense bar, however, contends that the decisions will have "devas-
tating consequences on the Bill of Rights and the legal system as a
whole."'" It believes that the provisions, so construed, "represent a fur-
ther milestone on the road to the complete stripping away of a citizen's
rights in America."' 14 1 Whether or not the decisions represent a setback
to the presumption of innocence, any further action on the question will
likely rest with Congress alone.
C. The RICO Refonn Act of 1989
Pending legislation known as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Reform Act of 1989142 (RICO Reform Act) marks the
third time in the last four years 43 that Congress has attempted to amend
138. See Note, supra note 64, at 555 ("probable cause requirement of the fourth amendment
defines the procedure or process due for seizure of persons or property in a criminal case.").
139. United States v. Monsanto, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2657, 2665 (1989); Fricker, supra note
133, at 64 (statement of Michael Olmsted, special counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for
Criminal Cases) ("ITmhe drug dealer [should be put] in the same position as the person who has
stolen a pocketbook."). See also United States v. Meinster, No. 79-105-CR-JKL (S.D. Fla. 1988)
(after the defendant paid his attorney, only $16,000 of $775,000 remained for forfeiture when
convicted).
140. Fricker, supra note 133, at 66 (quoting Neil Sonnett, president of the NACDL). The com-
plex questions presented by CCE and RICO cases demand quality counsel; the threat of not being
paid will drive these attorneys from the defense bar. Id. at 64.
141. Id. at 63 (quoting Anthony R. Cueto, Executive Director of the New York State Associa-
tion of Criminal Defense Lawyers). See also Id. (quoting defense attorney Jack T. Lipman) (the
decisions wreak "havoc on the attorney-client relationship"); Id. at 64 (quoting Neil Sonnet)
("[S]tripping defendants of their lawyers while they are still presumed innocent is a whole different
matter from stripping convicted drug defendants of profits.... [P]re-indictment or pre-conviction
forfeitures... will not only drive attorneys out of the practice but prevent defendant from obtaining
proper counsel."); Id. at 66 (quoting criminal-defense lawyer Stephen Komie) (The Monsanto deci-
sion is "the scourge of the Supreme Court").
142. H.R. 1046, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. E460 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1989) and S. 438,
101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. S1653 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1989) [hereinafter RICO Reform
Act] were introduced jointly into Congress on February 22, 1989 by Representatives Frederick
Boucher (D-Va) and George Gekas (R-Pa) in the House and Senators Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz)
and Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) in the Senate. For the legislation it would amend, see Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988) [hereinafter RICO].
143. See L.A. Daily J., May 4, 1989, at 24, col. 2 ("Despite strong support, however, RICO
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the civil action provisions under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO).1" Although Congress enacted RICO as a
tool for use against organized crime,14 the statute recently has gained
notoriety for its use in ordinary commercial litigation. 46 Under RICO's
present civil provisions, a private right of action is available in federal
court for any person "injured in his business or property"'147 as a result of
a RICO violation. 148  A prevailing plaintiff can automatically recover
treble damages, court costs, and attorney's fees. 149 The proposed reform
legislation would not bar RICO's use in civil suits, but instead would
attempt to limit the scope of civil RICO in response to what critics view
as an overabundance of "abusive" litigation.150
reform legislation failed in the final days of the 99th Congress in 1986, and again in the closing days
of the 100th Congress in 1988").
144. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988).
145. The Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose reports:
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States
by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new pe-
nal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the
unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.
18 U.S.C § 1961 (1988). See also 135 CONG. Rac. S1655 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) ("The avowed purpose of RICO was to decrease the incidence of, and act as a deterrent to,
organized crime").
146. Senator Hatch, introducing the RICO Reform Act of 1989 in a speech before the Senate
stated:
The civil provisions of the RICO statute, available to private plaintiffs, like the rest of
RICO, were intended to combat the infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized
crime.... Nowhere do the purposes of the legislation outlined by Congress mention pri-
vate business litigation. The only reason RICO contained civil provisions at all was that
some of its authors were concerned about limited enforcement capability on the part of the
Government in the fight against organized crime.... Congress intended the private civil
action to be linked to 'racketeering activity' in order to enhance law enforcement against
organized crime. [Section 1964(c)] was not intended to create a vehicle for treble damage
recoveries in ordinary commercial and business litigation.
135 CONG. REc. S1655 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1989).
147. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
148. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
149. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
150. See 135 CONG. REC. S1652 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1989) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) ( The
legislation's purpose is to restore the usefulness and effectiveness of the RICO statute that existed
prior to the explosion of abusive and harassing lawsuits filed in the 1980's .... RICO has been
undercut and thwarted by the misuse of RICO by plaintiffs and their attorneys who have employed
RICO to extort and blackmail defendants by bringing a RICO action every time they are involved in
a commercial dispute."); 135 CONG. REc. E460 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1989) (statement of Rep.
Boucher) ("The availability of civil RICO treble damages has dramatically upped the ante in com-
mercial litigation and leveraged substantial settlements on less than substantial allegations.").
See also N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1989, § 3, at 2, col. 3 (city ed.)
The law's broad civil suit provisions cast a net so wide that virtually any commercial dis-
pute becomes a candidate for civil RICO jurisdiction. Practically every kind of contro-
Washington University Open Scholarship
802 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 68:779
Congress enacted RICO as part of the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970111 to help federal prosecutors combat organized crime.15 2 RICO
contains approximately forty offenses defined as "racketeering activity,"
which may serve as predicates to a RICO violation. 53 RICO's criminal
sanctions154 apply if the prosecution proves that the defendant was in-
volved in an "enterprise" ' that engaged in a "pattern" '156 of criminal
conduct involving the predicate offenses. RICO also provides civil reme-
dies for private racketeering suits.15 7 As a result of the broad definition
of RICO's pattern requirements,15 lax pleading rules,159 and the wide
versy, from the common to the bizarre, has been the basis for civil RICO litigation. While
the statute has been used in divorce, inheritance, and landlord-tenant disputes, and in con-
troversies among church members, the vast majority of its applications are neither comical
nor of limited economic consequence.
But see Blakey, Study of Allegations of Litigation Abuse, 5 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 4-14
(June 20, 1989) (analyzing the Business/Labor Coalition for Civil RICO Reform's list of 53 "abu-
sive" cases, and concluding that the existing law adequately "weeds out" the truly abusive cases).
151. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified as aflended at 18 U.S.C §§ 1961-68
(1988)).
152. See Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose, supra note 145. See also 135 Cong.
Rec. S1652 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1989) (statement of Rep. DeConcini):
The racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations statute was enacted in 1970 at a time
when Congress was increasingly worried about the power and influence of organized crime.
Congress had devoted much time and attention to studying the activities of organized
crime syndicates and their efforts to infitrate legitimate businesses and unions. The result
of these studies was the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. Title IX of that act was
RICO.
153. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988) (listing the felonies which qualify as predicate acts under the
statute).
154. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988). Criminal sanctions include fines, imprisonment for not more than
20 years (or for life if violation includes predicate offense with a maximum penalty of life) and
forfeiture of property acquired through racketeering activity.
155. 18 U.S.C § 1961(4) (1988). RICO's broad definition of enterprise includes "any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity." Id. See Wisotsky, Cv/ RICO In A Nutshell, 82 Fla.
B.J., Nov. 1988, at 49 (author discusses several problems involved in proving the enterprise element).
156. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988). The pattern requirement under RICO requires the commission of
at least two predicate offenses over a 10-year period. The Supreme Court recently addressed the
definition of pattern in H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2893
(1989). For an analysis of the Court's holding see supra section I.A. of this project. See also Wisot-
sky, supra note 155, at 51 (author discusses several problems involved in proving the pattern
element).
157. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text. See also Wisotsky, supra note 155, at 49
("[RICO] is a hybrid statute in which the same misconduct gives rise to both civil and criminal
liability."); 135 CONG. REc. S1655 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("[T]he provi-
sions for private civil suit were included in RICO to provide economic victims of organized crime
adequate redress for their injuries.").
158. See supra note 156. See also 135 CONG. REc. S1655, S1666 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1989) (state-
ment of Sen. Hatch ) (For example, "alleging that a business has breached the Federal mail fraud
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variety of possible predicate offenses, 160 the amount of ordinary business
and commercial civil RICO litigation at the federal level has exploded. 16 1
Plaintiffs may institute civil RICO suits to take advantage of the possibil-
ity of obtaining treble damages, 162 or for the "potential use of the term
'racketeer' as a club in obtaining settlements."' 163
The RICO Reform Act of 1989, currently pending in Congress, 6" at-
tempts to amend RICO to clarify and limit its application in civil suits
resulting from alleged "racketeering" activity.1 65  The most significant
reforms in the proposal include the addition of new predicate offenses,' 6 6
the limitation of remedies in the majority of commercial disputes to ac-
tual damages and attorney's fees, with the retention of automatic treble
damages in only a few specifically defined cases,167 and the creation of a
special class of plaintiffs161 who may recover discretionary punitive dam-
and wire fraud statutes made it easy for plaintiffs, including business plaintiffs, to bring their litiga-
tion within the ambit of the civil RICO provisions.... [T]wo fraudulent mailings or uses of the
wires occurring within 10 years of each other might lead to civil RICO liability.").
159. See 135 CONG. Rac. B4_60 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1989) (statement of Rep. Boucher):
The pleading requirements are so minimal that virtually any contract dispute becomes a
candidate for civil RICO jurisdiction. If the plaintiff alleges the existence of a contract
dispute and can demonstrate that the mails or the telephone were used on several occasions
either in forming or breaching the contract and if the plaintiffis willing to allege fraud, as is
often the case in commercial disputes, the pleading requirements for a civil RICO case are
met.
160. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
161. See Wisotsky, supra note 155, at 49, 52 n.6. See also infra note 196.
162. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
163. Supporters of RICO Bill Deny Opposition Charges of 'Special Interest' Litigation, 5 Civ.
RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 2 (June 20, 1989) (comments of Rep. Hughes).
164. See supra note 142. As of October 30, 1989, H.R. 1046 had been referred to the House
Subcommittee on Crime and S. 438 had been referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
165. See supra note 150 (statement of Sen. DeConcini). See also 135 CONG. REc. S1656 (daily
ed. Feb. 23, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("The bill... curtails the abuses of RICO in the area of
garden variety litigation between businesses").
166. S.438, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § 2 (1989). The Reform Act adds one state law predicate
offense (prostitution involving minors) to 18 U.S.C § 1961(aXA). The Reform Act deletes six fed-
eral law predicate offenses, but adds thirty-two new federal predicate offenses. The wide variety of
additions include: acts indictable under § 32 (relating to destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities);
section 81 (relating to arson); section 2277 (relating to vessels); section 2331 (relating to terrorist acts
abroad); any offense under § 134 of the Truth in Lending Act; and any offense under § 586Qb)-(k) of
the Internal Revenue Code (relating to firearms control).
167. S.438, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 4(c)(1)(A),(5)(A) (1989) (limiting treble damage awards to
government entities and persons whose business or property is destroyed by a defendant convicted of
a predicate act).
168. The special class of plaintiffs is limited to 1) certain units of local government; 2) certain
tax-exempt persons and organizations, certain indenture trustees, certain pension funds, and certain
investment companies if injured by conduct proscribed by section 21(d)(2)(A) of the Securities Ex-
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ages up to double the amount of actual damages. 169 The legislation's
proponents deleted a controversial retroactivity clause which would have
applied the reform measures-subject to certain limitations-to all pend-
ing RICO litigation. 171
Supporters of the proposed reform 171 claim that civil RICO in its pres-
ent form has produced a proliferation of "abusive" litigation of a type
that RICO's drafters never intended. 172  They allege that the appeal of
treble damages and the lax pleading requirements 173 are the most signifi-
cant contributors to the explosion of civil RICO litigation.174  In addi-
tion, supporters of the bill assert that both the threat of treble damages
and the potential stigma of being labelled a "racketeer" have caused
many businesses to settle unwarranted suits. 75  Supporters also argue
that the unbridled use of civil RICO has threatened the exercise of funda-
change Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78 u(d)(2)(A)); and 3) natural persons if the injury occurred in
connection with the purchase or lease for personal or noncommercial use or investment of a product,
investment, service or contract for personal or noncommercial use or investment and neither state or
federal securities or commodities laws supply a remedy for the claim. Id. (emphasis added).
169. S. 438, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § 4(c)(2)(C) (1989).
170. S. 438, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § 8 (1989). See Retroactivity Provision in RICO Bill To Be
Withdrawn By DeConcini In Markup, 5 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 1 (Oct. 3, 1989) (The
bill's sponsors in the House and Senate stated that one of the reasons for their decision was the
"numerous comments and extensive testimony in Senate hearings opposing the retroactive applica-
tion of the proposed changes in RICO").
171. Supporters of the proposed reform include the securities and commodities industries, ac-
counting profession, the Business/Labor Coalition, AFL-CIO, ACLU, American Bankers Associa-
tion, and the ABA. Supporters of RICO Bill Deny Opposition Charges of 'Special Interest'
Legislation, supra note 163, at 1. Note that not all of these groups support the legislation as it now
exists in its entirety, but all agree that substantial reform is necessary. Id.
172. See supra note 150. See also RICO Termed Essential Tool to Combat 'Plague ofFraud'" 4
Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 5 (May 2, 1989) ("mhe RICO reforms are needed because civil
RICO claims are being used in suits against businesses in ways Congress did not intend when it
enacted the statute. Threats of RICO claims, with treble damages, are being used to force businesses
to settle civil claims they otherwise would not settle"). But see Blakey, supra note 150 (author's
study refutes allegations of abuse in the use of civil RICO).
173. See Supporters of RICO Bill Deny Opposition Charges of "Special Interest'Legislation, supra
note 163, at I ("innocent organizations and individuals can be brought into a RICO suit on the
criminal acts of another due to the liberal pleading requirements and the loose definition of 'enter-
prise' and 'pattern of racketeering' ").
174. See supra note 161.
175. See supra notes 150, 163 and accompanying text. See also S. 438, 101st Cong., Ist Sess.
§ 4(c)(10) (1989) (legislation prohibits the use of the term "racketeer" in a civil RICO action unless
the plaintiff alleges a crime of violence); 135 Cong. Rec. E460 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1989) (statement of
Rep. Boucher) ("Ordinary and respected businessmen and women, whose reputations are often their
principal stock in trade, have been branded as racketeers simply because they have become em-
broiled in a commercial dispute").
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mental constitutional rights such as freedom of speech. 17 6
Opponents of the proposed reform177 argue that the elimination of
treble damages in the majority of civil suits would weaken a valuable
enforcement mechanism that such suits provide and would lessen the
corresponding deterrent effect on those who might engage in racketeering
activities. 7 ' Critics also view the RICO Reform Act as special interest
legislation 179 that fails to remedy the alleged abuses inherent in certain
types of civil RICO litigation. 8 0 For example, the bill exempts securities
and commodities fraud from punitive damages where state or federal
laws provide a remedy for the type of conduct on which the case is
based.1"' Additionally, critics contend the proposed reform excludes the
176. See 135 Cong. Rec. § 14010 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1989) (statement of Sen. Humphrey):
Perhaps the most alarming abuse of RICO has been the threat it is presenting to freedom of
speech. There has recently been a rash of civil RICO actions being used to suppress dem-
onstrations and public protests which have nothing at all to do with racketeering activ-
ity .... The mere filing of these multimillion-dollar treble damage suits can have an
enormous chilling effect on political protest groups, which simply do not have the financial
and legal resources to cope with such suits.
See also Supporters of RICO Bill Deny Opposition Charges of 'Special Interest'Legislation, supra note
163, at 1 (June 20, 1989) (quoting Antonio Califa, legislative counsel for the ACLU) ("The stricter
pleading requirements, narrowing of the availability of treble damages, changing the level of proof,
and the elimination of the perorative term 'racketeer' will help curb some of the First Amendment
abuses engendered in current RICO law").
177. Opponents of the proposed reforms include insurance and security regulators, consumer
advocates and the Department of Justice. Bill to Limit Civil RICO Scope Introduced in House,
Senate, 4 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 2 (Feb. 28, 1989); Bill Would Curb Enforcement,
Justice, State Regulators Say, 4 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at 3 (May 9, 1989).
178. See RICO Termed Essential Tool to Combat 'Plague of Fraud, 4 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA)
No. 47, at 5 (May 2, 1989) ("The civil RICO statute, with its treble damages provision, is an essen-
tial tool that allows the private bar to help overburdened government enforcement agencies deal with
the 'plague of fraud' in industries such as banking, securities, and defense").
179. The special interest charge is primarily against the securities and commodities industry,
exempted from the Act's damage provision if sued by a natural person and if state or federal securi-
ties or commodities laws supply a remedy. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. See N.Y.
Times, Oct. 6, 1988, at 19, col. I ("It makes no sense to exempt commodities and securities frauds
when these seem rampant").
180. See Blakey, Possible Amendments to "The RICO Reform Act of 1989" (H.R. 1046), 5 Civ.
RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 1 (Aug. 8, 1989) ("The most telling objection that can be made to the
provisions of the proposed legislation is that little or no relation exists between the allegations of
abuse (frivolous suits) and the provisions supposedly designed to remedy them.... In fact, some
allegations of abuse (abortion protest litigation) are hardly touched by the supposed reforms. Time
after time, the baby (the basic design of RICO to vindicate the rights of victims of crime) is being
thrown out with the bath water (supposed litigation abuses)").
181. See S. 438, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § 4(c)(2)(B)(iii) (1989); Blakey, supra note 180, at 5
("Even more troubling is the securities and commodities exception to consumer fraud"); See also S.
438 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § 4(cX7)(A) (1989) (proposed reform also provides insurers and other
regulated businesses with an affirmative defense that they relied in good faith on an "action, ap-
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most appropriate group of plaintiffs from instituting investment fraud
private civil RICO suits."8 2 As a result, most critics conclude that the
legislation "goes well beyond the rationale of the allegations of
misuse."' 183
Critics of the bill have offered a substantial number of options either to
replace the RICO Reform Act18 4 or simply to strengthen some areas of
the legislation that they contend the drafters did not address ade-
quately.1 85  Although persons on both sides of the reform issue agree that
the existing statutory definitions and predicate offenses require further
refinement in order to narrow RICO's overly broad scope,18 6 the reform
bill actually adds new predicate offenses.' 7 Other suggestions which ad-
proval, or interpretation of law by an authorized Federal or State agency in writing or by operation
of law"); House Judiciary Witnesses, Including ABA, Debate Pending RICO Reform Bill, 52 Banking
Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 1320 (June 19, 1989) (reform legislation "creates procedural roadblocks to
protect regulated industries by allowing them to delay trial through an 'affirmative defense' that they
acted in reliance on the action or inaction of a regulatory agency").
182. See S. 438, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § 4 (1989). See also Blakey, supra note 180, at 4 ("Under
the provisions of the proposed legislation, only the following limited class may sue: units of local
government; natural persons; charities; undenied trustees; pension funds; and investment companies
.... It ought to include individuals and entities that need special protection because of their relative
vulnerability or because they represent others who fall into that class"); Bill Would Curb Enforce-
ment, Justice, State Regulators Say, supra note 177, at 3 ("it is 'unconscionable' to limit those who
can bring investment fraud private civil RICO actions to 'natural persons' to the exclusion of invest-
ment companies, pension funds, banks, savings and loan associations, and other potential plaintiffs.
These are the entities most likely to be victims of marketplace fraud and best suited and financed to
take action against it").
183. Blakey, supra note 180, at 4 (Aug. 8, 1989) ("Ostensibly, the purpose of the proposed legis-
lation is to curtail general commercial fraud litigation under RICO. As such, it would make more
sense directly to limit-subject to carefully drafted exceptions-such legislation between commercial
entities").
184. See Blakey, Alternative Legislative Proposals to "The RICO Reform Act of 1989" 5 Civ.
RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 12, part 2, at I (Aug. 15, 1989) (the author, a professor at Notre Dame Law
School, drafted two potential legislative alternatives to the present reform bill). See also RICO Re-
form Merits Second Look, House Subcommittee Panel Says, Sec. Week, at 6 (Aug. 28, 1989) (Chair-
man of the House Subcommittee on Crime, Rep. William Hughes (D-N.J.) expressed interest in
drafting an alternative piece of legislation "that would not gut civil RICO").
185. See infra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
186. See Bill Would Curb Enforcement, Justice, State Regulators Say, supra note 177, at 3 (peo-
ple have "suggested that the subcommittee take a broader look at both the civil and criminal provi-
sions to determine exactly what conduct the law should cover").
187. See supra note 166; see also Supporters of RICO Bill Deny Opposition Charges of 'Special
Interest' Legislation, supra note 5, at 2 ("the addition of new predicate acts, as called for by H.R.
1046, 'just complicates things further "); Mathews Says RICO Bill Likely to Pass, Ensuring Contin-
ued CivilLitigation, 4 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 6 (Mar. 7, 1989) ("The proposed legislation
doesn't provide any clarification of existing statutory definitions of 'pattern of racketeering activity'
or 'enterprise'... [resulting] in even more RICO litigation"). But see Blakey, supra note 180 (author
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dress the concern of "abusive" litigation include: using federal prosecu-
tors to screen private complaints;"' 8 imposing sanctions for frivolous
suits; 189 and assessing attorney's fee against plaintiffs in private racke-
teering suits if the RICO claim is "not substantially justified."'1 90
The proposed legislation includes numerous compromises meant to
placate both the business and consumer lobbies. 191 As a result, the bill is
presently quite complex' 92 and fails to address some of the more serious
shortcomings of the original civil RICO. 193 Although some measures
may be necessary to limit civil RICO, it is imperative that reform not
remove RICO's ultimate deterrent effect on organized and white collar
crime. 194 Indeed, one commentator suggested an amendment that "em-
bodies neither the interest of the plaintiff nor the defendant, but of the
public."' 195
The ultimate, overall effect of the RICO Reform Act on subsequent
civil RICO litigation is difficult to predict. The elimination of treble
damages in most private civil RICO suits may result in fewer cases of
calls for the addition of even more crimes, in particular, hazardous waste offenses, as predicate
offenses).
188. See New Justice Authority Proposed to Screen Private RICO Claims, 4 Civ. RICO Rep.
(BNA) No. 49, at 5 (May 16, 1989) ("Establishing a central authority in the Department of Justice
to screen private civil RICO claims and bar those that fal to meet certain minimal standards could
curb inappropriate uses of the statute.... [T]he standard for private RICO cases should be whether
a criminal prosecutor, working 'in a world of unlimited resources,' would have filed charges").
189. See id. at 6 (Professor Blakey claims that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 (sanctions on
attorneys for frivolous filings) and 56 (court imposed sanctions when affidavits are made in bad faith)
are sufficient to deter frivolous cases).
190. Supporters of RICO Bill Deny Opposition Charges of 'Special Interest'Legislation, supra note
163, at 3 (The ABA, among others, suggested the change of assessing "attorney's fees against plain-
tiffs who don't prevail on the merits in business-to-business suits").
191. See The L.A. Daily J., May 4, 1989, at 1, col. 5 ("If this bill were to be a straight treble-
damages for governmental entities and actual damages for everybody else, it would be a two-page
bill.... But because the consumer lobby demanded that they be treated differently than everybody
else, you have exceptions to their exceptions").
192. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing added predicate offenses); note 168
and accompanying text (discussing special class of plaintiffs for punitive damages). See also The
L.A. Daily J., supra note 191 (the bill creates "a byzantine hierarchy of categories for RICO plain-
tiffs and defendants .... Whatever reform may or may not be achieved in the process, the end
product will likely provide myriad complexities and uncertainties for practitioners to study and liti-
gate and for courts to ponder and interpret.").
193. See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
194. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1989, at 19, col. I ("Reducing damages would reduce deterrence.
It makes no sense to exempt commodities and securities frauds when these seem rampant.") quoted
in Blakey, supra note 180, at 2.
195. See Blakey, supra note 180 (the author agrees that some reform is necessary but believes the
present legislation inadequate).
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private or commercial litigation. Whether this is desirable as a matter of
public policy is beyond the scope of this discussion. Significantly, Con-
gress has not actually found substantiation for claims of "abusive" litiga-
tion in any hearings thus far.196 Without such a finding, restricting treble
damages in civil RICO suits may not be the best way to fine-tune the
statute because of the undeniable deterrent value in this remedy. 197
Ironically, the number of civil RICO suits may actually increase under
the RICO Reform Act. The bill's sponsors chose to include twenty-
seven new predicate offenses that significantly broaden RICO's scope.
198
This increase in the number of predicate offenses-coupled with the al-
ready lax pleading requirements, 199 which the bill's sponsors did not
amend-may significantly increase civil RICO litigation.200 Finally, the
bill would transform a forty-eight word section creating a civil RICO
remedy into a sixteen page monstrosity of complex and undefined legal
parameters.201 The bill, if enacted, likely will contribute to increased liti-
gation, because these complex provisions will require extensive litigation
to test their application and scope.
Perhaps the best avenue of reform would be to clarify the definition of
the "pattern" and "enterprise" requirements for private civil suits, liber-
ally impose sanctions for frivolous suits, and reduce the amount of dam-
ages that a plaintiff could receive if relying exclusively on mail or wire
196. See Supporters of RICO Bill Deny Opposition Charges of 'Special Interest'Legislalion, supra
note 163, at 2 ("Rep. John Conyers (D-Mich) flatly stated that the alleged 'wave' of RICO cases
'simply doesn't exist' "); Blakey, supra note 150, at 6 ("Between December 1979 and January 1988,
approximately 1,910,520 cases were filed in the federal district courts. Of that number, approxi-
mately 2,742 were RICO filings"); RICO Termed Essential Tool to Combat 'Plague of Fraud" 4 Civ.
RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 5 (May 2, 1989) ("Public Citizen, a consumer public interest group
that opposes elimination of treble damages, questioned business' claims of RICO abuses in settle-
ments of civil suits. No documentation of the alleged abuses has been presented before Congress or
elsewhere").
197. See supra note 188-190 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 166.
199. See supra note 159.
200. Also, the proposed legislation does not address the recent suits instituted by or against
political and other protest groups. See, eg., Eveland v. Director of Central Intelligence Agency, 843
F.2d 46 (1st Cir. 1988) (plaintiff, challenging conduct of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East,
brought a civil RICO action against the CIA and its director); Northeast Women's Center Inc. v.
McMonagle 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1988) (plaintiff abortion clinic brought civil RICO action against
anti-abortion protestors); Christian Populist Party v. Secretary of State, 650 F. Supp. 1205 (E.D.
Ark. 1987) (plaintiffs brought civil RICO action against the State of Arkansans challenging the state
election statute).
201. See The L.A. Daily J., May 4, 1989, at 24, col. 1.
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fraud in commercial litigations. 2° Such a solution would retain the de-
terrent effect of the private enforcement mechanism and provide a fair
remedy for victims, eliminating the threat of meritless suits. In any
event, Congress should consider other reform options offered on both
sides of the debate before passing the pending legislation.
II. THE MAIL FRAUD STATUTE: EXPANDING ITS SCOPE
Congress and the Supreme Court have recently expanded the scope of
the federal Mail Fraud Statute" 3 (section 1341), which proscribes use of
the mails in connection with undefined schemes to defraud, or schemes
to obtain money or property by fraud. 2 ' First, in 1988, Congress ex-
panded the class of schemes section 1341 prohibits to include schemes to
deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.20 5 Second, in
1989, the United States Supreme Court in Schmuck v. United States2 °6
relaxed the standard of relatedness required to satisfy section 1341's
mailing requirement to include incidental mailings in ongoing
schemes.2 °7 Both actions should increase the already abundant use of
section 1341 by federal prosecutors, who regard the mail fraud statute as
"our Stradivarius, our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuinsinart-
and our true love." 20
202. See supra notes 158-60, 188-90 and accompanying text.
203. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
204. Section 1341 provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises .... for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting to do so
[uses the mails or causes them to be used], shall be fined not more than $1,000 or impris-
oned not more than five years, or both.
Id.
205. Congress had not previously defined § 1341's phrase "scheme or artifice to defraud." See
supra note 204. In 1988, Congress added § 1346 to Title 18 of the United States Code as part of the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4508 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C
§ 1346 (1988)). Section 1346 provides: "For the purposes of this chapter, the term 'scheme or
artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right to honest
services." 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988). For a discussion of this new provision, see infra notes 209-34
and accompanying text.
206. 109 S. Ct. 1443, reh 'g denied, 109 S. Ct. 2091 (1989). For a discussion of Schmuck, see
infra notes 245-60 and accompanying text.
207. The elements of a mail fraud offense include: "(1) a scheme to defraud, and (2) the mailing
of a letter, etc., for the purpose of executing the scheme." Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8
(1954).
208. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 Duq. L. Rev. 771 (1980). "We may
flirt with RICO, show off with lOb-5, and call the conspiracy law 'darling,' but we always come
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.4. The Intangible Rights Doctrine: The Law After 18 U.S. C § 1346
In McNally v. United States,209 the Supreme Court overturned four de-
cades of lower court precedent that established the intangible rights doc-
trine,21 0 holding that section 1341 did not protect citizens' intangible
right to honest government. 21 1 The Supreme Court interpreted section
home to the virtues of 18 U.S.C § 1341, with its simplicity, adaptability, and comfortable familiarity,
it understands us and, like many a foolish spouse, we like to think we understand it." Id. at 771.
209. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
210. The intangible rights doctrine originated some forty years before the McNally decision. In
1941, the Fifth Circuit suggested in dicta that the corruption of a public fiduciary constituted a
scheme to defraud the public under the mail fraud statute. Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110,
115 (5th Cir. 1941), cert denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1942). Shushan involved the defendant's scheme to
obtain a public contract on favorable terms by bribing a public official. Id. In United States v.
Proctor & Gamble Co., 47 F. Supp. 676, 678 (D. Mass. 1942), a federal district court held that the
corruption of a private fiduciary relationship could likewise constitute a scheme to defraud in viola-
tion of the mail fraud statute. In Proctor & Gamble, the defendants bribed a competitor's employees
to obtain trade secrets from their employer. The court stated this scheme defrauded the competitor
of its lawful right to loyal and honest employees. Many commentators characterize these two deci-
sions as the cornerstones of the mail fraud intangible rights doctrine. See, eg., Coffee, From Tort to
Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line
Between Law and Ethics, 19 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 117, 128-30 (1981); Note, McNally v. United States.
Intangible Rights Declared a Dead Letter, 37 CATH. U.L. REv. 851, 853 (1988).
Since these decisions, every appellate court addressing the issue interpreted the disjunctive lan-
guage of § 1341 to include schemes to defraud individuals, or the government of intangible rights.
McNally, 483 U.S. at 358. In one such decision, United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir.
1973), cert denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974), the Eighth Circuit affirmed the mail fraud convictions of
two candidates for duty offices. The mail fraud convictions arose out of the candidates' attempts to
obtain absentee ballots for fictitious voters. Id. at 762. The indictment charged the defendants with
scheming to defraud the public of "certain intangible political and civil rights." Id. at 765. The
court focused on the statute's disjunctive phrasing of its prohibitions against "scheme[s] . . . to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property." The court concluded that the statute reached two
species of schemes: 1) schemes to defraud and 2) schemes to obtain money or property by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses. Id. at 764. The Eight Circuit reasoned that defendants' activities
constituted a scheme to defraud. Id. at 765.
Following the States decision, the intangible rights doctrine came into widespread use. Mail
Fraud: Termination of the "'Intangible Rights"Doctrine-McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875
(1987), 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 286 (1988). Federal prosecutors targeted political corruption
as a major federal law enforcement priority and attacked such corruption with the Mail Fraud Stat-
ute. Baxter, Federal Discretion in the Prosecution of Local Political Corruption, 10 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 321, 332 (1983). See, eg., United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304 (7th Cir.), vacated 484 U.S.
807 (1987) (county judge); United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982) (state political
party leader); United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979), vacated, 862 F.2d 1067 (4th
Cir. 1988) (Governor of Maryland) (post-McNally motion successful).
Prosecutors also successfully attacked election fraud under the intangible rights theory. See, e.g.,
United States v. Girdner, 754 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1985) (candidate for state legislature); United
States v. Odom, 736 F.2d 104 (4th Cir. 1984) (candidate for sheriff).
211. 483 U.S. at 360. The defendants in McNally were politically active in the Democratic Party
in Kentucky. Id. at 352. Governor Carroll appointed Hunt as chairman of the state Democratic
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1341 to protect only property rights.212 It considered the language and
history of section 1341 as well as Supreme Court precedent 213 and con-
cluded that section 1341 codified the common understanding of "de-
fraud" as referring exclusively to a deprivation of property through
deceit.214
Party with de facto control over selection of the agencies from which the state would purchase its
insurance. Id. Hunt negotiated with the Wombwell Insurance Company that, in exchange for that
company's continued selection as the procuring agent for the state's workmen's compensation insur-
ance, the company would share its commissions with other companies Hunt specified. Id. Hunt
designated, among others, a company that he and defendants Gray and McNally owned and oper-
ated. Id. at 353. Hunt pled guilty to mail and tax fraud and the court sentenced him to three years
in prison. Id. Federal prosecutors charged defendants Gray and McNally with mail fraud "based
on the mailing of a commission check to Wombwell by the insurance company from which it had
secured coverage for the state." Id. The indictment alleged that the defendants had devised a
scheme (I) to defraud the citizens and government of Kentucky of their right to have the State's
affairs conducted honestly, and (2) to obtain money and property through false pretenses and the
concealment of material facts. Id. The jury convicted the defendants, and the court of appeals
affirmed the conviction based on the intangible right to honest and impartial government. Id. at 355.
212. Id. at 360.
213. The Court considered the original language of the statute which prohibited only "any
scheme or artifice to defraud." 483 U.S. at 356. Examining the "sparse legislative history," the
Court concluded § 1341's original purpose was to protect people from schemes to deprive them of
their money or property. Id. The Court then considered the first Supreme Court interpretation of
the statute, Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896), which held that courts should construe
the phrase "any scheme or artifice to defraud" broadly "insofar as property rights are concerned, but
did not indicate that the statute had a more extensive reach." 483 U.S. at 356 (emphasis added).
The Court acknowledged Congress' 1909 amendment to § 1341 which added the disjunctive lan-
guage "or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representa-
tions, or promises." Id. However, the Court believed the addition of this second phrase was not
intended to make a distinction between general schemes to defraud and schemes to defraud of prop-
erty, but to make it "unmistakable that the statute reached false promises... as to the future as well
as other frauds involving money and property." Id. at 359.
214. 483 U.S. at 359. The Court applied the doctrine of lenity, which provides, "when there are
two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, we are to choose the harsher
only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite language." Id. at 359-60 (citations omitted).
The Court, therefore, read the statute as "limited in scope to the protection of property rights"
rather than "constru[ing] the statute in a manner that leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous and
involves the Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure and good government for local
and state officials . I..." Id  at 360.
In dissent, Justice Stevens attacked the majority's disregard for § 1341's disjunctive phrasing. 483
U.S. at 364-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens asserted that the statute's language, through
the use of the term "or," made clear that each prohibition was independent. Id. A person could
violate the first clause by devising a scheme or artifice to defraud without violating the second clause
by seeking to obtain money or property through false pretenses. Id. at 365.
After McNally, defendants and convicted parties flooded the federal courts with motions to dis-
miss active prosecutions or vacate past convictions premised on the intangible rights theory. See,
e.g., United States v. Walgren, 885 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1989) (mail fraud and RICO convictions
vacated); Callanan v. United States, 881 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1989) (mail fraud conviction vacated);
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The Supreme Court clarified its McNally holding in Carpenter v.
United States."' Carpenter involved a scheme in which the defendants
used advance information about the contents and publication schedule of
an influential Wall Street Journal column as a basis for stock trading.216
The Carpenter defendants, indicted for mail fraud, argued that a publica-
tion's interest in prepublication confidentiality was an "intangible consid-
eration," outside the reach of section 1341.217 The Court rejected the
defendants' argument and characterized the publication schedule and
column contents as intangible property fully within the scope of section
1341.218 The Court noted that "[c]onfidential business information has
long been recognized as property," '219 and explained that its McNally
holding did not limit section 1341's scope to tangible as distinguished
from intangible property.220 The Court further clarified its holding re-
garding intangible property, explaining that an entity need not suffer a
loss of money or property as a result of the improper use of its confiden-
tial information to establish a violation of the statute.22' Thus, after Car-
United States v. Kato, 878 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1989) (conviction upheld because insufficient mail
fraud charge contained every element of conspiracy to defraud government); United States v. Mar-
cello, 876 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1989) (mail fraud and RICO convictions vacated); United States v.
Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1988) (former Governor of Maryland's ten-year old mail fraud and
RICO convictions vacated); United States v. Saly, No. 86-67CR(l), slip op. (E.D. Mo. July 6, 1989)
(first conviction set aside post-McNally; after retrial, indictment dismissed for failure to allege prop-
erty violation of mail fraud statute).
215. 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987).
216. Defendant Winans co-wrote the "Heard on the Street" column for the Wall Street Journal.
108 S. Ct. at 318-19. Winans conspired with other defendants to provide them prepublication infor-
mation and the publication schedule of the column. Id. at 319. The information allowed the con-
spirators to trade on stocks in anticipation of the columns impact on the market. Id. In a four
month period the conspirators net profits from the stock trades were about $690,000. Id. After a
bench trial, the court convicted the defendants of securities fraud and mail fraud. Id.
The fraud that triggered § 1341 was not that perpetrated against the innocent parties who traded
stocks with the conspirators. The prosecutors alleged that defendants perpetrated a mail fraud
against the Wall Street Journal based on the conspirators' use of the Journal's confidential informa-
tion. 108 S. Ct. 320. The Court found that the Journal's use of the wires and mails to print and
distribute its papers satisfied the § 1341 mailing element. Id. at 322.
217. The defendants argued that the conspirators' activities did not violate the mail or wire fraud
statutes because the players did not obtain any money or property from the Journal as require under
McNally. 108 S. Ct. at 320.
218. Id. at 320. The Court held that the conspirators defrauded the Journal of its confidential
information and thus out of property. Id. at 321-22.
219. Id. at 320 (citing Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001-04 (1984); Dirks v.
SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 n.l0 (1983); Board of Trade of Chicago v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198
U.S 236, 250-51 (1905)).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 321. Petitioners argued that because they had not interfered with the Journal's use of
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penter, the Supreme Court sanctioned mail fraud convictions involving
schemes to deprive persons of judicially recognized intangible property
rights, but not those involving schemes to deprive persons of other intan-
gible rights.
Congress addressed this development in 1988 by enacting section
1346.222 Section 1346 expressly extends the protections of the mail and
wire fraud statutes to the "intangible right of honest services." 223 With
section 1346, Congress plainly intended to overrule McNally and revive
the intangible rights theory.224 What is not clear, however, is whether
sections 1341 and 1346 now protect the entire spectrum of intangible
rights.
The clearest case is one like McNally in which the scheme consists of
payments to a government official in exchange for favorable treatment.225
This type of scheme, corrupting a public fiduciary, deprives the citizenry
of its collective right to honest service from its government officials and is
the most likely type of fraud Congress targeted in section 1346.226
Analogous schemes exist in the private sector. Courts have found union
officials, who have private fiduciary obligations to their unions, guilty of
defrauding their unions by accepting kickbacks.227 One could argue
forcefully that both situations above result in the deprivation of "honest
services," acts now specifically prohibited by sections 1341 and 1346.
Whether section 1346 covers cases not involving the corruption of
its information, they had not harmed the Journal. Id. The Court rejected petitioners' arguments
that a loss of money or property was a necessary element of a scheme to defraud based on intangible
property. Id. The Court found it sufficient that the conspirators deprived the Journal of its right to
exclusive use of its information. Id.
222. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4508 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988)).
223. 18 U.S.C § 1346 (1988). For the text of this section see supra note 205.
224. No House or Senate Report accompanied Congress' passage of § 1346. However, Repre-
sentative John Conyers, the floor sponsor of § 1346, submitted comments on the amendment's pur-
pose. 134 CONG. REc. H 11251 (daily e.d October 21, 1988). Representative Conyers stated, "This
amendment restores the mail fraud provision to where that provision was before the McNally deci-
sion.... Thus it is no longer necessary to determine whether or not the scheme or artifice to defraud
involved money or property." Id.
225. In McNally, the government official solicited the bribe but the effect was the same; the
citizens were deprived of the official's honest service.
226. See supra note 224 (comments of Representative John Conyers indicating purpose of § 1346
was to overturn McNally).
227. See, eg., United States v. Zauber, 857 F.2d 237 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub. nor.,
Scotto v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 1340 (1989). The district court in Zauber, in an unpublished
opinion, found union pension fund trustees and general counsel guilty of defrauding the fund of the
right to honest and faithful employees. The Third Circuit vacated the mail fraud conviction as based
on intangible rights theory. Id.
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public or private fiduciaries is less clear. For example, a more difficult
case involves election fraud where campaign workers use the mails to
falsify votes, thus defrauding the citizenry of its right to an honest elec-
tion.228 An even tougher question would involve schemes to defraud in-
dividuals of their right to privacy.22 9 Both of these scenarios were
prohibited by pre-McNally interpretations of the Mail Fraud Statute.230
On its face, section 1346 does not refer to these types of schemes.231
The only legislative history available for section 1346, however, suggests
these schemes should be included. Representative Conyers, floor sponsor
of section 1346,232 commented, "This amendment is intended merely to
overturn the McNally decision. No other change in the law is in-
tended. ' 233 Because all of the schemes described above were prohibited
by the pre-McNally Mail Fraud Statute, once section 1346 overturns Mc-
Nally, section 1341 may again cover those fact patterns. 234
228. This situation is distinct from the facts of McNally because the candidate is not yet elected.
As such, she and her workers may not yet owe the public the duty of "honest services."
229. Examples of such fraud might include tricking the post office into giving information re-
garding private individuals. See infra note 230. Here, unlike any of the previous examples, there is
not even an allegation that the fraudulent acts will lead to dishonest services.
230. See ag., United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148 (3d Cir.) (Mail Fraud Statute applies to
party chairman), cert denied 469 U.S. 1085 (1984); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir.
1973), cert denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974) (Mail Fraud Statute covers candidates for city office); United
States v. Condolon, 600 F.2d 7 (4th Cir. 1979) (wire fraud conviction related to bogus talent agency
designed to seduce women); United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383, (9th Cir. 1978) (debt col-
lectors convicted of wire fraud for misrepresenting themselves to the telephone company and the
post office in order to obtain infoiUnation that deprived subscribers and boxholders of their privacy).
Although the Condolon and Louderman cases involved wire fraud, they are also relevant to mail
fraud because the mail and wire fraud statutes are nearly identical in wording. Compare 18 U.S.C
§ 1343 (1988) with 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988). Also, both are affected by § 1346.
231. Section 1346 defines § 1341's "scheme or artifice to defraud" to include "a scheme or arti-
fice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services." The "honest services" language
implies a fiduciary relationship, not a right to an honest election or right to privacy.
232. "[W]hile the comments of a sponsor are not determinative of legislative intent, congres-
sional intent may be inferred from statements of a sponsor on the floor." United States v. Berg, 710
F. Supp. 438, 442 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (citations omitted). Such inferred intent may of necessity be
particularly strong in the case of § 1346, because no other Congressman spoke on the section and no
House or Senate Report was produced. Id.
233. 134 Cong. Rec. Hl1251 (daily ed. October 21, 1988) (emphasis added).
234. Notwithstanding the legislative history behind § 1346, discussed supra at text accompany-
ing note 233, the new provision on its face would not appear to cover the non-elected candidate or
the privacy deprivation hypothesized in note 231 above. Nevertheless, one could make an argument
that these scenarios should receive Mail Fraud Statute protection. The language of § 1346 is not
restrictive; the provision merely says a "scheme or artiface to defraud" includes schemes to deprive
another of the intangible right of honest services. The statute as written still does not address other
intangible rights. Because a court would therefore need to look to the legislative history of the Mail
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol68/iss3/19
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B. Incidental Mailings In Ongoing Schemes: Schmuck v. United
States
While Congress, through section 1346, expanded the scope of the Mail
Fraud Statute's scheme element, the Supreme Court, in Schmuck v.
United States,2 3' expanded the scope of the mailing element to include
incidental mailings in ongoing schemes. Prior to Schmuck, the Court
several times addressed the issue of whether a mailing was sufficiently
closely related to the defendant's scheme to bring his conduct within the
Mail Fraud Statute's mailing element.2 36 In Kann v. United States,2 37 the
defendants set up a dummy corporation that issued the defendants fraud-
ulent checks. They cashed the checks at local banks, and the local banks
mailed the checks to the drawee bank for collection. The Court found
these mailings insufficient to meet the mailing requirement: the schemes
had reached "fruition" when the defendants received the money irrevo-
cably and "[iut was immaterial to [the defendants], or to any consumma-
tion of the scheme, how the bank that paid or credited the check would
collect from the drawee bank. '238
Again in Parr v. United States,239 the Court held the mailing insuffi-
ciently related to the scheme to meet the Statute's mailing element. In
Parr, the defendants used their employer's credit card without authoriza-
tion. The mailing at issue was the card issuer's mailing of collection in-
voices to the defendants' employer. The Court held these mailings were
insufficiently connected to the execution of the scheme because it was
immaterial to the defendants how the credit card issuer went about col-
lecting its payment.2'
Finally, in United States v. Maze,2 41 the Court once again held the
mailings too unrelated to meet the Statute's requirement. Maze also in-
volved a defendant's unauthorized use of a credit card. The two mailings
Fraud Statute and § 1346 for guidance, it would find Congress' intent to overturn McNally. See
supra note 233 and accompanying text. The court might then decide Congress intended in § 1346 to
overturn McNally's broad holding-that all intangible rights not deemed to be property rights are
not protected.
235. 109 S. Ct. 1443 (1989).
236. The Mail Fraud Statute requires a mailingfor the purpose of executing a scheme or artifice
to defraud. See supra note 207.
237. 323 U.S. 88 (1944).
238. Id. at 94.
239. 363 U.S. 370 (1960).
240. Id. at 393.
241. 414 U.S. 395 (1974).
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at issue were the proprietors' mailing of card invoices to the issuing bank,
and the bank's mailing of a bill to the credit card owner.242 The Court
viewed these mailings as merely account adjustments on which the suc-
cess of the defendant's scheme did not depend in any way. In fact, the
Court noted, the defendant probably would have preferred to have the
invoices misplaced and never mailed at all.243
In Schmuck v. United States,2' the Court upheld a used-car distribu-
tor's mail fraud conviction related to an odometer tampering scheme.245
This time the court held that the defendant Schmuck satisfied the mailing
element when the unwitting dealers, who bought the altered cars from
Schmuck,246 mailed title-application forms necessary to complete sales247
to retail customers. 248 The Court reasoned that Schmuck's scheme had
not reached fruition until the dealers completed the retail sale of the al-
tered vehicles, because if the dealers could not resell the cars, Schmuck
could not continue to sell tampered cars to the dealers.249 The Court
asserted that a mailing satisfied the mailing element when it was "inci-
dent to an essential part of the scheme. . . or a step in the plot. 250
In Schmuck the Court distinguished the mailings at issue from those
held not to satisfy the mailing element in Kann, Parr, and Maze.25 1 The
Schmuck Court characterized the mailings in the earlier cases as involv-
ing "post-fraud accounting among potential victims of the various
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. 109 S. Ct. 1443 (1989).
245. Id. at 1450.
246. Several of the dealers purchased from Schmuck on a consistent basis over a period of about
15 years. Id. at 1448.
247. To complete the resale of each car, the dealer would mail a title-application for to the
Wisconsin Department of Transportation on behalf of his customer. Id. at 144546. The receipt of a
Wisconsin title was a prerequisite to completing the resale; without it, the dealer could not transfer
title and the customer could not obtain Wisconsin tags. Id. at 1446.
248. Id. at 1448. Schmuck argued that prosecutors may predicate mail fraud only on a mailing
that affirmatively assists the perpetrator in carrying out his fraudulent scheme. Id. at 1447.
Schmuck asserted that a mailing, routine and innocent in and of itself, could not satisfy the mailing
element. Id. The Court disagreed with Schmuck's characterization of the mailings at issue and with
his description of mail fraud law. Id.
249. The transactions at issue involved twelve cars. Id. at 1448.
250. Id. at 1447 (quoting Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916)). At least one
commentator has invited the courts to treat the mailing requirement as nothing more than "an overt
and jurisdictional act." Rakoff, supra note 208, at 821.
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schemes." '252 The long-term success of each fraud did not turn on these
"post-fraud" mailings.25 3 The Court concluded the long-term success of
Schmuck's fraud, however, depended on the mailing of the title-registra-
tion forms. The mailing was an essential step in passing title to retail
purchasers, and "failure in this passage of title would have jeopardized
Schmuck's relationship of trust and goodwill with the retail dealers upon
whose unwitting cooperation his scheme depended." '254
In a strong dissent, Justice Scalia255 criticized the Court's attempt to
distinguish the mailings at issue from those in Kann, Parr, and Maze.
256
Scalia maintained that, analogous to these cases, Schmuck's fraud was
complete with respect to each car when he pocketed the dealer's money.
"It was as inconsequential to him whether the dealer resold the car as it
was inconsequential to the defendant in Maze whether the defrauded
merchant ever forwarded the charges to the credit card company. "257
Scalia noted that in Kann, the Court rejected the government's proposed
theory of ongoing fraud25 that was identical to the theory the Schmuck
majority adopted.259
C. Conclusion
With the enactment of section 1346, federal prosecutors once again
have the means of attacking corrupt government officials and private fi-
duciaries through the use of the Mail Fraud Statute.2" One must wait to
see whether imaginative prosecutors and courts will look to Representa-
tive Conyers' remarks261 as a source of authority262 to stretch sections
1346's "honest services" language to cover the full spectrum of fraudu-
lent schemes, including election fraud and privacy rights.26 3
252. 109 S. Ct. at 1449.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor joined in the dissent.
256. 109 S. Ct at 1454 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
257. Id.
258. The government's theory was that the defendants intended to continue to issue fraudulent
checks through their dummy corporation. The clearing of these first checks, therefore, was essential
to their ability to cash future checks. Kann, 323 U.S. at 95. The Kann Court concluded, however,
that the check-clearing transactions "were merely incidental and collateral to the scheme and not
part of it." Id.
259. 109 S. Ct. at 1454 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
261. See supra text accompanying note 233.
262. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 228-234 and accompanying text.
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A prosecutor's success under Schmuck will depend on her ability to
characterize the scheme as an ongoing one, incomplete in the absence of
the alleged mailing.2 The prosecutor must "combin[e] all of the indi-
vidual transactions into a single scheme," '265 and allege that the success
of each subsequent transaction depended upon the mailing incidental to
the previous transactions. Given federal prosecutors' affection for the
Mail Fraud Statute,266 it is safe to predict that they will apply the Court's
strategy lesson and reach frauds accompanied by only incidental
mailings.
264. See supra notes 244-254 and accompanying text.
265. 109 S. Ct. at 1454 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
266. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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